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FINANCIAL INSTABILITY, TAX POLICY, AND THE TAX
EXPENDITURE CONCEPT
Tim Edgar
ABSTRACT
As a public policy goal, moderation of financial instability has gained some prominence
in the face of the recent credit contraction. Not surprisingly perhaps, the role of the tax system in
exacerbating instances of financial instability has begun to receive some attention in the taxpolicy literature. Consistent with the general thrust of that literature, this article explores, in a
very preliminary way, how some selected tax-base rule choices line up with an explicit goal of
ensuring that the tax system supports regulatory and monetary policies intended to moderate
financial instability. The article frames the inquiry in terms of Hyman Minsky‟s “financial
instability hypothesis” as an explanation of the sources of financial instability. Minsky‟s work
suggests how excessive leverage and risk taking arise and can be seen as defensible targets
informing the choice of certain tax-base rules, many of which are conventionally characterized
in the tax-policy literature as efficiency-reducing concessions to revenue concerns. In this
respect, the article draws on tax-expenditure analysis to re-conceptualize the possible design of
some of these familiar income base rules whose justification is altered somewhat when framed
against Minsky‟s explanation of the sources of financial instability.
More particularly, the article reviews the incomplete manner in which dividend
imputation systems commonly address a tax bias in favor of corporate debt, and how this
incompleteness can be justified as a means to promote maintenance of margins of safety. The
article also reviews the case for and design of loss limitations as applied to financial
instruments, as well as restrictions on the deduction of interest expense under the personal
income tax as a form of loss limitation. No claim is made to definitively resolve any of these base
design issues; nor is there a complete canvassing of all of the possible issues whose resolution is
potentially affected by a focus on financial instability. The purpose of the article is the much
more modest one of suggesting how standard analyses of interest deductibility and the treatment
of losses might be reframed with moderation of financial instability as a public policy goal.

Professor, Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada and the
University of Sydney. An earlier version was presented at “Tax Expenditures and Public Policy in
Comparative Perspective” held in Toronto on September 11-12, 2009 and sponsored jointly by Osgoode
Hall Law School and the Canadian Tax Foundation. The author would like to thank Art Cockfield, Tsilly
Dagan, Edward Kleinbard, Geoff Lloyd, and Miranda Stewart for helpful comments and suggestions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is now somewhat trite to observe that the recent credit contraction is the most
significant financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. But this financial crisis is
only the latest installment (albeit the most severe) in a series occurring over the past 25 years,
including:1
the savings and loan implosion in the United States;
the stock market crash of 1987;
the bursting of the Japanese real estate and stock market bubbles;
the Nordic banking crises of the early 1990s;
the Asian financial crisis;
the bailout of the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, in the face of the
financial market turmoil occasioned by the default of the Russian government on its
ruble-denominated debt; and
the bursting of the technology share bubble.
The wild boom and bust swings characteristic of capital markets during this relatively
brief period appear to have provoked renewed interest in the causes of asset price bubbles2 and
business cycles,3 with the latter believed by many, until recently at least, to have been eliminated

1

For a detailed historical account of financial crises, see CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT
ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed., 2005).
See also CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); and FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE,
UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES 1-26 (2007).
2

See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 1 (“...; by definition a bubble involves a nonsustainable pattern of price changes or cash flows.”).

3

See e.g., Yair Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy Through the Income Tax Code, 123 TAX NOTES 1575,
1575 (2009) (noting renewed interest in the use of the tax system as a policy instrument to stabilize the
economy).
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by continued growth supported by monetary policy focused on wage and consumer price
inflation. The contraction of the global credit system triggered by the bursting of the housing
bubble in the United States has also highlighted what was already an emerging reexamination of
the intellectual framework of orthodox financial economics.4
The role of tax policy in all of this financial market mayhem is beginning to attract some
attention. For example, the International Monetary Fund (“the IMF”) recently released a
thoughtful and detailed paper exploring the possible relationship between the tax system and
financial instability.5 The IMF paper‟s principal points of emphasis are the well-known tax bias

4

See e.g., David Colander, Hans Follmer, Armin Haas, Michael Goldberg, Katarina Juselius, Alan Kirman,
Thomas Lux, & Brigette Sloth, The Financial Crisis and the Systematic Failure of Academic Economics,
(Modeling of Financial Markets, 98th DAHLEM WORKSHOP, 2008), available at
http://www.debtdeflation.com/.../Dahlem_Report_EconCrisis021809.pdf (criticizing the economics
profession for the construction of theoretical models based on unrealistic assumptions and for failing to
communicate the limitations of those models). But see also J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos, The
Virtues and Vices of Equilibrium and the Future of Financial Economics, 14 COMPLEXITY 11(2008)
(arguing that equilibrium models can be useful, but they have limitations which require economists to
explore alternative approaches and directions). For a technical and mathematical account of financial
markets as dynamic systems, see JOSEPH L. McCAULEY, DYNAMICS OF MARKETS: THE NEW
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS (2d ed., 2009).
5

INT‟L MONETARY FUND, DEBT BIAS AND OTHER DISTORTIONS: CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES
IN TAX POLICY (June 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf
[hereinafter IMF, CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES]. The paper was preceded by a brief note suggesting the
various lines of inquiry that the IMF was pursuing. See INT‟L MONETARY FUND, TAX POLICY AND
THE CRISIS – FIRST THOUGHTS (Feb. 2009), available at
http://www.itdweb.org/documents/.../IMF_feb_2009_full_article.pdf. See also Samuel T. Eddins, Tax
Arbitrage Feedback Theory (Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356159; Thomas
Hemmelgarn & Gaetan Nicodeme, The 2008 Financial Crisis and Taxation Policy (CESIFO Working
Paper No. 2932, January 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546973; Michael Keen, Alexander
Klemm, & Victoria Perry, Tax and the Crisis, 31 FISCAL STUDIES 43 (2010); Geoff Lloyd, Moving
Beyond the Crisis: Using Tax Policy to Support Financial Stability (OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Scoping Paper by the Secretariat, June 30-July 1, 2009),
available at http://www.lib.kdi.re/download.do?gubun=hotissue&newsno=3245; Douglas A. Shackelford,
Daniel Shaviro, & Joel B. Slemrod, Taxation and the Financial Sector (May 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601330; Daniel Shaviro, The 2008-09 Financial Crisis: Implications for Income
Tax Reform (NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-35, Aug. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Shaviro,
Financial Crisis], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442089; and Joel Slemrod, Lessons for Tax Policy
in the Great Recession, 62 NAT‟L. TAX J. 387 (2009).Two academic workshops on the relationship
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in favor of corporate debt, as well as tax preferences for housing. There is also some discussion
of the possible effects of tax preferences for managerial compensation, loss limitations and risk
taking, and tax-driven financial innovation, particularly in the cross-border context. The IMF
paper emphasizes that, at the macro level, tax is probably of secondary importance in any attempt
to realize a rough balance between financial stability and economic growth. This secondary role
is suggested most obviously by the fact that the tax biases identified as possibly contributing to
financial instability have been part of tax systems for some time and probably cannot be seen as
precipitating the latest crisis (or even the series of crises over the past 25 years).6 Nonetheless,
because of its magnitude, this latest financial crisis brings into sharper focus the need for tax
rules that can be seen to support regulatory and monetary policy in the sense that any behavioral
responses do not exacerbate financial instability.7 With this secondary role in mind, the IMF
paper tentatively supports measures that attempt to realize consistency of treatment along certain
behavioral margins. The suggestions tend to be broadly consistent with familiar arguments for
reform in the various areas highlighted in the IMF paper. Indeed, these arguments are entirely
independent of maintenance of financial stability as a public policy goal.

between tax policy and the financial crisis have also been held recently. See TAX POLICY AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS (Apr. 30, 2009) ECONPUBBLICA, Center for Research on the Economics of the
Public Sector, Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan; and RETHINKING THE TAXATION OF
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT CRISIS (Feb. 5, 2010) New York
University School of Law, Office of Tax Policy Research, Ross School of Business, University of
Michigan, and University of North Carolina Tax Center, http://www.bus.umich.edu/Conferences/Taxationof-the-Financial-Sector.
6

See e.g., Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, supra note 5, at 2 (“While taxes have not generated the crisis, some
aspects of tax policy may have led to increased risk-taking and indebtedness of banks, households and
companies.”); Lloyd, supra note 5, at 17 (“… taxes were not the root cause of the financial crisis, but tax
rules for individuals and corporates may have encouraged financial instability through encouraging risktaking, risky credit and corporate leverage, and through a lack of transparency facilitated by tax havens.”);
and Shaviro, Financial Crisis, supra note 5, at 3 (observing that any causal relationship between tax policy
and the recent credit crisis remains unclear). But see Martin A. Sullivan, Deleveraging the Tax Code, 120
TAX NOTES 1241 (2008) (emphasizing a close link between interest deductibility for income tax purposes
and levels of leverage).
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This article similarly explores how some selected aspects of tax policy line up with an
explicit goal of ensuring that the tax system supports regulatory and monetary policies intended
to moderate financial instability. The article differs, however, from the IMF paper, as well as the
other limited literature on the same subject,8 in two respects. First, it frames the inquiry explicitly
in terms of a theoretical perspective that attempts to explain the sources of financial instability.
Second, the discussion draws on the tax-expenditure concept and tax-expenditure analysis to reconceptualize the design of some familiar income base rules whose justification is altered
somewhat when framed against this particular explanation of the sources of financial instability.
Part II begins, therefore, with a brief description of Hyman Minsky‟s financial instability
hypothesis,9 which explains how excessive leverage and risk taking arise; as the sources of
financial instability, they can be seen as defensible targets informing the choice of certain taxbase rules, many of which are characterized in the tax-policy literature as efficiency-reducing
concessions to revenue concerns. Part III then attempts to advance this suggestion at a broad
conceptual level by reviewing some familiar ground covered in the tax-expenditure literature. It
is argued that the tax-expenditure concept can usefully frame the assessment of various tax rules
as prone to excessive leverage and risk taking. Tax-expenditure analysis can be invoked to
supplement standard technical tax-policy analyses of these provisions once they are framed in
this much different manner.

7

Shaviro, Financial Crisis, supra note 5 (emphasizing the need for tax rules to avoid behavioral responses
that exacerbate the causes of financial crises).
8

9

See supra note 5.

Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis is articulated most completely in HYMAN P. MINSKY,
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter MINSKY, STABILIZING]. With the
first edition out of print, recent interest in Minsky‟s ideas led to publication of a second edition (2008),
posthumously, under the guidance of Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and L. Randall Wray, two former colleagues
of Minsky‟s at the Levy Economics Institute. Much of the earlier development of the financial instability
hypothesis is found in HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1975).
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At a macro level, the tax-policy literature tends to highlight the use of a progressive
personal income tax and broad-based consumption taxes as automatic stabilizers.10 Consistent
with the IMF paper, Parts IV and V go further and examine some fundamental tax-base rule
choices with a view to moderating financial instability. Part IV reviews the tax bias in favor of
corporate debt and, more particularly, how the incomplete manner in which dividend imputation
systems commonly address this bias can be justified as a means to promote maintenance of
margins of safety. Part V examines the case for and design of loss limitations as applied to
financial instruments, as well as restrictions on the deduction of interest expense under the
personal income tax as a form of loss limitation. The article makes no claim to resolve any of
these particular base design issues; its purpose is the much more modest one of suggesting, in a
very preliminary way, how standard analyses of interest deductibility and the treatment of losses
might be reframed with moderation of financial instability as a public policy goal.
Given this modest aim, the review of the income base design issues in the last two parts
is necessarily incomplete.11 Perhaps most importantly, there is no discussion of issues unique to

10

See e.g., Christian E. Weller & Manita Rao, Can Progressive Taxation Contribute to Economic
Development? (Political Economy Research Institute, Univ. of Massachusetts, Working Paper Series No.
176, July 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298636 (finding a link between progressive personal
income taxation and economic stability through an ability to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies). For a
review of the empirical literature on the relationship between fiscal policy, business cycles, and
stabilization, see Young Lee & Taeyoon Sung, Fiscal Policy, Business Cycles and Economic Stabilisation:
Evidence from Industrialised and Developing Countries, 28 FISCAL STUDIES 437, 439-41(2007)
(finding from a data set of 94 countries that government current expenditures, subsidies, and transfers move
counter-cyclically, whereas taxes and capital expenditures move pro-cyclically). See also Listokin, supra
note 3, at 1578-80 (observing that the counter-cyclical effect of a progressive personal income tax rate
structure can be enhanced by indexation to the rate of economic growth); and Yair Jason Listokin, Tax
Expenditures and Business Cycle Fluctuations (John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and
Public Policy, Research Paper No. 378, Apr. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1372782
(emphasizing the pro-cyclical nature of some tax expenditures).
11

For a more complete canvassing of the possible tax-policy issues whose resolution is potentially affected
by a focus on moderation of financial instability, see IMF, CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES, supra note 5;
Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, supra note 5; Keen, Klemm, & Perry, supra note 5; Lloyd, supra note 5; and
Shaviro, Financial Crisis, supra note 5. See also Martin A. Sullivan, 10 Tax Changes to Prevent the Next

8

the financial sector.12 Parts IV and V note only in passing how some of the rule choices applied
on the demand side of capital markets might be modified when applied on the supply side: that
is, the financial services sector. There is similarly no discussion of: (i) the effect on risk taking of
the provision of preferential tax rates for managerial compensation;13 or (ii) the use of a
transactions tax to moderate financial instability.14 Adequate discussion of any of these subjects,

Fiscal Crisis, 124 TAX NOTES 1295 (2009) [hereinafter Sullivan, 10 Changes] (briefly describing a set of
tax-reform measures intended to moderate financial instability).
12

See e.g., Shackelford, Shaviro, & Slemrod, supra note 5, at 6-15 (discussing the theory and design of
corrective taxes as applied to the financial sector). See also Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), The International Policy Responses to Financial Crises: Making the
Macroprudential Approach Operational - Panel Remarks, Jackson Hole (Aug. 21-22, 2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp090911.htm; Tobias Adrian & Markus Brunnermeier, CoVAR (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 348, Aug. 27, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1269446; and Viral V. Acharya, Lasse H. Pedersen, Thomas Philippon, &
Matthew Richardson, Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 283 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (suggesting the
use of a capital charge as a corrective tax capturing the marginal contribution of individual financial
institutions to system-wide risk). A “financial activities tax,” levied on the sum of profits and remuneration
of financial institutions, is suggested in INT‟L MONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRIBUTION BY THE FINANCIAL SECTOR (June, 2010), available at
http://www.itdweb.org/documents/.../IMF_ H.R 4173 IH proposes the adoption of a tax on wholesale
liabilities of large financial institutions as a means to recover some of the cost of the provision of liquidity
and capital insurance by the US government. See Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Taxing Financial
Pollution, 126 TAX NOTES 697 (2010).
13

See IMF, CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES, supra note 5, at 29-31(highlighting deferred taxation of executive
stock options and capital gains treatment of the return to the carried interests of fund managers as the two
principal forms of tax-preferred managerial compensation which may affect risk taking). See also Shaviro,
Financial Crisis, supra note 5, at 20 (suggesting that the tax system should disfavor poorly designed
incentive arrangements). But see Rudiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the
Credit Crisis (Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2009-13, July 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (finding: (i) no evidence that alignment of managerial incentives with the
interests of shareholders resulted in better bank performance during the credit crisis; and (ii) option
compensation did not have an adverse impact on performance). France and the United Kingdom recently
adopted temporary taxes on bonus payments to financial sector employees. See Shackelford, Shaviro, &
Slemrod, supra note 5, at 17-18.
14

See e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Imperfect Financial Markets and the Hidden Costs of a Modern Income
Tax, 62 SMU L. REV. 239 (2009) (proposing the application of a transactions tax to derivative financial
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with moderation of financial instability as a policy goal, warrants separate treatment. Finally, the
subject of tax avoidance is largely ignored.15 The unique issue in this area is the relationship, if
any, between risk taking and tax-avoidance activity. This also appears to be a subject that
requires separate treatment, primarily as an empirical inquiry.16 It is possible, however, that the
broad conceptual framework described in the article can usefully frame the discussion of these
other issues in much the same way that it does the tax-base rule choices reviewed in Parts IV and
V.

II.

MINSKY‟S FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS AND THE
MISMEASUREMENT OF RISK

Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis emphasizes the role of leverage as the source of
persistent financial instability in sophisticated market economies. The instability may be
exacerbated by the development of a broad range of derivative financial instruments, as well as
fundamental weaknesses of finance theory that have led to the mismeasurement of risk. This

instruments to dampen increased counterparty default risk in the presence of the scaling up of bets
associated with such instruments to eliminate the effect of income taxation). There is a deep literature on
the design of financial transaction taxes as a policy instrument to dampen excessive volatility in
commodities and securities markets. This literature is surveyed in Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial
Transactions: Issues and Evidence (IMF Working Paper WP/10/**, June 2010), available at http://wwwbec.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010 See also Hemmelgarn & Gale, supra note 5, at 27-35 (concluding that
the effects of a financial transactions tax on asset price bubbles are ambiguous and preferring elimination of
the preferential treatment of debt as a more promising means to avoid excessive leverage and risk taking).
15

There is some limited discussion of tax planning along the debt-equity boundary when interest and
dividends are treated inconsistently for a range of investors. See infra notes 161-67, and accompanying text.
16

IMF, CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES, supra note 5, at 25-28 (noting the lack of understanding of the effect
of tax-driven financial innovation, including securitization, as well as the use of low-tax jurisdictions in
cross-border tax planning). The growing empirical literature on corporate governance and tax sheltering
would appear to suggest a weak link between tax avoidance and risk taking. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO,
DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 174-78 (2009) [hereinafter Shaviro, DECODING]
(briefly reviewing some of the relevant literature). But see also Eddins, supra note 5 (characterizing
securitization and credit default swaps as tax-driven transactions requiring the creation of low-quality
mortgages with systemic risk implications); and Hemmelgarn & Gale, supra note 5, at 26 (characterizing
Eddins‟s tax arbitrage feedback theory as “a seducing and rather convincing theory” that requires empirical
testing).
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broader economic framework highlights the significance of excessive risk taking attributable to
excessive leverage and the mismeasurement of risk as sources of default risk and the associated
systemic risk. On the assumption of an optimal allocation of resources in the absence of the
change in price occasioned by the imposition of taxes, tax policymakers have ignored these
effects while focusing on micro-level incentives. At a macro level, these incentives can
exacerbate the effect of nontax factors as causes of financial instability, with potential costs for
the economy that are borne, in part, by innocent third parties. In this respect, excessive leverage
and risk taking, at a macro level, can be viewed as a negative externality.17
A. FINANCIAL STABILITY AS A PUBLIC POLICY GOAL AND LEVERAGE AS A
SOURCE OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
Because a focus on maintenance of financial stability as a public policy goal would seem
to require a working definition of the concept,18 it is perhaps surprising that the content of this
concept has not been articulated with any precision; like the corresponding concept of price
stability, it may inevitably be somewhat flexible.19 This characteristic is evident, for example, in
one of the more thorough attempts to define financial stability, provided by Allen and Wood,20
who also canvass various policy instruments that can be used to promote financial stability. They
begin the definitional exercise by noting that public policy interest in financial stability reflects

17

See IMF, CIRSIS-RELATED ISSUES, supra note 5, at 12 (characterizing excessive leverage as a
negative externality that is not captured by micro-economic models focused on the level of firm-specific
borrowing as a function of the internalization of bankruptcy costs).
18

See William A. Allen & Geoffrey Wood, Defining and Achieving Financial Stability, 2 J. FINANCIAL
STABILITY 152, 152 (2006) (noting the lack of a widely accepted definition of financial stability and the
lack of any associated consensus regarding the policies that should be pursued to promote financial
stability).
19

But see Allen & Wood, supra note 18, at 153 (arguing that, despite differences regarding some of the
details of the concept of price stability, there is considerable common ground which is reflected in a clarity
of objective and similarity of policies that is not the case with financial stability).
20

Id. See also Garry J. Schinasi, Defining Financial Stability (IMF Working Paper WP/04/187, October
2004), available at http://www-bec.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04/87.pdf .
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an awareness of the negative social and economic consequences associated with an episode of
financial instability. They argue that it is useful to think of financial stability as a property of a
system much like that in the physical sciences. A financially stable economy is said to be one
that “does not degenerate into instability when it experiences … an unexpected event or shock …
or the unexpected failure of a substantial company.”21 Allen and Wood then canvass possible
characteristic features of an episode of financial instability, which they define as:22
“episodes in which a large number of parties, whether they are households, companies,
or (individual) governments, experience financial crises which are not warranted by their
previous behavior, and where these crises collectively have seriously adverse macroeconomic effects.”
For households, businesses, and governments, a financial crisis occurs when access to
funds is curtailed such that spending plans must be curtailed. But financial instability at a micro
level does not mean that an economy experiences an episode of financial instability at a macro
level. At some admittedly ill-defined point, the extent of individual crises becomes so pervasive
that innocent bystanders get hurt.23 Moreover, as Allen and Wood recognize, financial stability as
a property of an economy is not completely observable, because an episode of financial
instability can be latent and policymakers cannot be certain that the economy will be able to
dampen rather than amplify a shock that precipitates a crisis. Given these circumstances, the best
that policymakers can do is to monitor “certain crucial features of an economy … and to draw
inferences from such monitoring about the financial stability of an economy.”24 This necessary
monitoring function is arguably performed most effectively when policymakers have an adequate

21

Id. at 155. See also Schinasi, supra note 22, at 8 (“A financial system is in a range of stability whenever it
is capable of facilitating (rather than impeding) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating financial
imbalances that arise endogenously or as a result of significant adverse or unanticipated events.”).
22

Allen & Wood, supra note 18, at 160.

23

Id. at 159-60.

24

Id. at 155.
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model capturing the causes of episodes of financial instability. Despite lacking some of the
formal features of a model, Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis can be seen to serve this
function.25
The intuition underlying Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis is deceptively simple
in its description of the financing function. As Minsky emphasizes, his hypothesis is an
interpretation of Keynes‟s classic work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money,26 but with an emphasis on the debt financing of investment, rather than fluctuations in
household demand and savings, as the principal source of instability.27 At its core, the financial
instability hypothesis is a theory of “the impact of debt on system behavior and also incorporates
the manner in which debt is validated.”28 As a finance theory of investment, the level of profits is
the key determinant of system behavior, since profits validate debt.

25

See GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT
BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY, 158 (2008) (concluding that policymakers
should develop macroeconomic policy using the financial instability hypothesis as the only model
adequately explaining financial market behavior). But see Elisabetta De Antoni, The (too?) Optimistic
„Financial Keynesianism‟ of Hyman Minsky, available at
http://www.ius.unicas.it/mc2005/papers/deantoni.pdf , at 23-24 (noting some weaknesses of the financial
instability hypothesis and suggesting that Minsky seemed sufficiently aware of them to label his analysis an
hypothesis rather than a theory). Kindleberger draws on Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis to frame
his historical account of financial crises. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 24-37.
26

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY (1936). See De Antoni, supra note 25, at 23-25 (contrasting Minsky‟s emphasis on upward
instability with Keynes‟s focus on a depressed economy).
27

28

See De Antoni, supra note 25, at 2-5.

Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (The Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper
No. 74, 1992), at 6 [hereinafter Minsky, Financial Instability Hypothesis].
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More particularly, Minsky illustrates how, at the macro level, aggregate profits for each
period equal aggregate investment and depend on aggregate spending on investment.29 At a micro
level, he argues that firms must be able to realize a markup over labor costs and will pursue
market power to do so. Prices, therefore, have five discrete functions:30
to ensure that a surplus is generated;
to ensure that some of the surplus accrues to business owners;
to ensure that the demand price of capital assets is consistent with the supply price;
to ensure that debt finance commitments can be satisfied; and
to ensure that resources are allocated to the investment sector.
In a capitalist economy, these functions are discharged in the form of two sets of prices:
one for current output and one for capital assets.31 The price of current output depends on shortrun expectations of demand and wage rates. Spending on investment depends on the demand
price (the price that a purchaser is willing to pay) and the supply price (the price that a producer
is willing to accept) of capital assets. Investment occurs and profits are generated when the
demand price of capital assets exceeds the supply price. The latter is a function of the costs of
production, which consist primarily of purchase price (costs of labor plus a markup) and
financing costs. The former is a function of expectations about future profits. In other words,

29

MINSKY, STABILIZING, supra note 9, at 157-90. The aggregate amount of profits equals the sum of
investment plus consumption out of profits plus the government‟s deficit and any trade surplus, less savings
out of wages. In a simplified model without government deficits, balanced trade, and no savings out of
wages, profits equal investment (plus consumption by capitalists, which is negligible). See e.g., De Antoni,
supra note 25, at 5-13; Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall Wray, Minsky‟s Analysis of Financial
Capitalism (The Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 275, 1999), at 6-9; and Janelia Tse,
Minsky‟s Financial Instability Hypothesis, 4 OECONOMICUS 77-81, 79-80 (2001).
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MINSKY, STABILIZING, supra note 9, at 157-90. See also Tse, supra note 29, at 79.
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Tse, supra note 29, at 80.
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capital asset prices reflect long-run expectations of future profits, but also the borrower‟s and
lender‟s risk associated with the financing of investment. Borrower‟s risk is the risk of losing
equity with increased levels of borrowing. Lender‟s risk is the risk of default, which increases
with the level of debt financing.
Investment thereby links the price of capital assets with the price of current production.
But the uncertainty associated with expectations of future profits and the financing of capital
assets with debt makes the economy unstable. Expectations of profits depend on future
investment, with realized profits determined by investment. In short, businesses invest now
because they expect investment to occur in the future. Financial intermediaries are the critical
actors in this process; they receive savings from households which are provided to businesses for
production, with a reverse flow of funds moving from businesses to households again through
financial intermediaries. The flow of money to businesses occurs as a response to expectations of
future profits, while the flow of money from businesses is financed by realized profits.
Expectations of profits determine the flow of financing contracts to businesses and the value of
those contracts, with the past, present, and future linked by these financial relations. Expectations
are validated when realized profits equal or exceed commitments in the financial contracts as the
outcome of negotiations between financial intermediaries and businesses. Minsky‟s description
of financial relations is not limited, however, to businesses; it extends to households and
governments by way of their ability to borrow on the basis of expectations of future cash flows.
Moreover, his description extends to an open-economy setting when businesses, households, and
governments borrow internationally.32
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Minsky, Financial Instability Hypothesis, supra note 28, at 4-5. See also Philip Arestis & Murray
Glickman, Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion the Minskyan Way, 26 CAMBR. J.
ECON. 237 (2002) (arguing that the sources of instability identified by Minsky are intensified in an openeconomy setting); and Jan Kregel, Managing the Impact of Volatility in International Capital Markets in an
Uncertain World (The Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 558, 2009) (describing the
transmission of financial instability through international capital flows and risk-management techniques of
multinational banks).
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The explanatory power of these essential features of Minsky‟s financial instability
hypothesis is captured in his two theorems. The first theorem holds that the character of the
financial relations predominating at any time in an economy determines its financial stability.33
In this respect, Minsky describes three states of financial relations characteristic of economic
units: hedge finance, speculative finance, and Ponzi finance. A hedge finance unit is
characterized by an ability to fulfill payment commitments with realized cash flows. Because
equity finance provides a margin of safety in the event that realized profits are less than payment
commitments under debt contracts, economic units with greater weighted levels of such finance
will tend to be hedge finance units. A speculative finance unit is one that can meet its interest
and similar income account commitments as they fall due, but cannot repay the amount of its
principal repayment obligations and must roll over or refinance its liabilities on maturity. A
Ponzi finance unit is one that cannot fulfill its obligations to pay interest or principal as they
become due and must borrow against rising asset prices or sell assets to meet these commitments.
Equity finance, and the associated margin of safety, is reduced as a Ponzi unit relies on either or
both of asset sales and further borrowing. An economy that is dominated by hedge finance units
is stable in the sense that it is vulnerable only to external shocks. An economy that is dominated
by speculative and Ponzi finance units is unstable in the sense that it is vulnerable to shocks, both
internal and external.
Minsky‟s second theorem holds that capitalist economies tend to move from a financial
structure dominated by hedge finance to a structure dominated by speculative and Ponzi finance
during periods of prolonged prosperity.34 The transition occurs as realized profits continue to
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Minsky, Financial Instability Hypothesis, supra note 28, at 7-8.

Ibid. Much the same process is described by John Geanakoplos as the “leverage cycle.” See e.g., John
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1715, July 2009) [hereinafter
Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycle], available at http://www.cowles.econ.yale.edu/. See also Franklin Allen &
Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 110 THE ECONOMIC J. 236 (2000) (constructing a simple model in
which agency problems associated with leveraged investment in risky assets cause those assets to be priced
above their fundamental value in the context of a credit expansion).
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validate debt, which increases expectations of future profit levels and investment financed by
greater levels of debt.35 Financial intermediaries are supposed to function as skeptics and
prudently dampen the excessive enthusiasm of businesses so that realized profits are more likely
to be sufficient to fulfill commitments. But, as Minsky emphasizes, financial intermediaries are
profit-seeking enterprises that innovate in their acquisition of assets and marketing of liabilities.
In effect, financial intermediaries constantly innovate in their profit-seeking role as “merchants
of debt”36 and tend to fuel the transition to speculative and Ponzi finance during periods of
prolonged prosperity. Financial intermediaries and businesses (as well as households) become
increasingly confident and downplay the need for margins of safety while increasing the price of
capital assets.37 An ostensibly stable economy is essentially destabilized by its tranquility, as past
success leads to expanding credit and the assumption of riskier positions. A “Minsky moment” 38
can occur, for example, when the inevitable inflationary pressures lead monetary authorities to
tighten credit and an expansionary credit cycle tips over to a credit contraction phase.
Speculative units become Ponzi units, and Ponzi units see their net wealth disappear. Debt
deflation follows as financial intermediaries call in debts and tighten the provision of new credit,
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This process is famously captured by the label “irrational exuberance,” which was used by Alan
Greenspan, when he was chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank in testimony before Congress, to
describe the US stock market bubble in the mid-1990s. The label was arguably made that much more
famous when Robert Shiller subsequently used it as the title of his book describing the same asset price
bubble. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (1st ed., 2000).
36

Minsky, Financial Instability Hypothesis, supra note 28, at 6 (“… thus, bankers … are merchants of debt
who strive to innovate in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market.”).
37

See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 1. See also Caruana, supra note 12 (emphasizing the feedback
effects of credit extension, leverage, risk perceptions and risk appetite, asset prices, and economic activity
which together can make the financial system more complex and characterized by nonlinear dynamics); and
Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycle, supra note 34 (emphasizing the significance of reductions in collateral
requirements during periods of prosperity which are then increased in a debt deflationary environment).
38

Minksy never used the term “Minsky moment” to describe the downward shift in a business cycle with
the ensuing necessity to sell assets to meet payment commitments. The term was apparently coined by a
bond fund director, Paul McCulley, during the Russian debt crisis. See Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult,
Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., August 18, 2007, at A1.
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while borrowers must sell assets to fulfill payment commitments. The ensuing collapse of asset
values and profits only exacerbates the debt deflation,39 resulting in increasing bankruptcies,
recession, and a depression in the extreme.

B. DERIVATIVES AND THE MISMEASUREMENT OF RISK AS SOURCES OF
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
In contrast with neo-classical economic theory, Minsky takes seriously the financial
intermediation function, which he refers to generically as “banking.”40 He describes a
sophisticated capitalist economy as characterized by expensive capital assets and a sophisticated
financial system required for the deployment of such assets. Present money pays for the
resources needed for the creation and use of capital assets in production; it is exchanged for
liabilities which commit producing units to pay future money in the form of profits at specified
dates under specified conditions. Borrowers and lenders expect that profits generated by the
capital assets will exceed financing commitments, but because this does not always turn out to be
the case, financial stability cannot be taken as an assumed condition.
The dynamics of this financing function, which are described by Minsky as the source of
financial instability, do not depend on a premise of irrationality on the part of investors along any
behavioral margin.41 Rather, the instability-breeding characteristics of the market for financial
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See e.g., E. Philip Davis & Mark R. Stone, Corporate Financial Structure and Financial Stability, 1 J.
FINANCIAL STABILITY 65 (2004) (finding that the debt-equity ratios of firms are correlated with
investment and inventory declines following crises). The process of debt deflation was first described by
Irving Fisher, The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337 (1933).
40

MINSKY, STABILIZING, supra note 9, at 173 (“In today‟s standard economic theory, an abstract nonfinancial economy is analyzed. Theorems about this abstract economy are assumed to be essentially valid
for economies with complex financial and monetary institutions and usages. This logical jump is an act of
faith ...”). See also Papadimitriou & Wray, supra note 29, at 4-6 (describing the assumptions underlying the
orthodox microeconomic and macroeconomic models criticized by Minsky).
41

See COOPER, supra note 25, at 101 (“... financial instability is hard wired into the mechanics of the asset
and debt markets; it is therefore unnecessary to resort to the still-contentious arguments of behavioural
finance to demonstrate market instability. But this is not to say that behavioural finance should be ignored,
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assets are the product of rational responses to market signals, albeit with exacerbating behavioral
dynamics attributable to human shortcomings such as cognitive biases and the use of heuristics in
decision making under uncertainty.42 Minsky‟s challenge to neoclassical orthodoxy can be
characterized, therefore, as a fundamental one distinguishing the market for consumer goods and
services from the market for financial assets. The pricing mechanism of the former operates to
allocate resources. Increased demand for an item triggers an increase in supply and vice versa,
with changes in price equating demand and supply such that markets clear. Because of this
process, the market for consumer goods and services is equilibrium seeking: That is, it is
inherently stable, since only external shocks can move the market pricing mechanism off course
into a state of disequilibrium. As emphasized by Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis, the
market for financial assets is much different in that it is characterized by the search for scarcity
value in an environment in which supply does not respond completely to changes in price.43 An
increase in price can stimulate increased demand without a corresponding increase in supply,
while a decrease in price can cause a decrease in demand without a contraction of supply. In this

as this area can also give rise to powerful positive feedback cycles.”); and Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycle,
supra note 34, at 3 (“But a crucial part of my leverage cycle story is that every agent is acting perfectly
rationally from his own individual point of view.”). See also ROBERT J. BARBERA, THE COST OF
CAPITALISM: UNDERSTANDING MARKET MAYHEM AND STABILIZING OUR ECONOMIC
FUTURE 186 (2009) (“…behavioral finance … provides modern day insights that buttress Minsky‟s
financial instability hypothesis. Championing the notion that mainstream theory should embrace important
parts of Minsky‟s thesis, in effect, also amounts to ending the fringe status of behavioral finance.”).
42

Shiller provides a thorough account of various factors driving the herd mentality that produces the kind of
powerful positive feedback effects emphasized by Minsky. See Shiller, supra note 35; Robert Shiller,
Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System, in HANDBOOK OF MACROECONOMICS
1 (John B. Taylor & Michael Woodford eds., Vol. 1, 1999); and GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J.
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 11-56, 131-48 (2009). See also ANDREI SHLEIFER,
INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
43

COOPER, supra note 25, at 7-8. But see also RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN
DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 213-20
(2007) (emphasizing demand and supply of liquidity as the principal driver of price movements rather than
the revelation of information).
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type of market, it is the rate of price change that affects demand rather than price change itself;44
such a market is not equilibrium seeking and is inherently unstable.
Orthodox financial theory has nonetheless tended to ignore these fundamental
differences and has largely transplanted the pricing mechanism of the market for consumer goods
and services as a conceptual framework for the modeling of the pricing mechanism of the market
for financial assets.45 As expressed in the “efficient market hypothesis,”46 this orthodoxy posits
that at any point in time, the price of particular financial assets incorporates all relevant
information – concerning both the present and the future - and is the correct price as determined
by the forces of supply and demand. Prices are seen to move in response to new information, and
only external shocks can force the market into a state of disequilibrium. Price movements are
entirely random, with this characteristic of financial markets providing the conceptual foundation
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Cooper, supra note 25, at 8. See also Jack Treynor, Bulls, Bears, and Market Bubbles, 54 FINANCIAL
ANALYSTS J. 69 (1998) (arguing that investors‟ different views mean that there are winners and losers as
prices change in response to new information, with the resulting wealth effect creating a new equilibrium
and wealth shift that can cause greater subsequent price changes).
45

For accessible and entertaining accounts of the development of financial theory, see PETER L.
BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET
(1992); PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
(1996); and PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS EVOLVING (2007) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN,
EVOLVING].
46

The efficient market hypothesis is the outcome of a deep literature which attempts to explain the
apparently random price movements in markets for financial assets and commodities. For a bibliographic,
as well as temporal, listing of the various research contributions to the development of the efficient market
hypothesis, along with significant contributions to the behavioral finance school of thought, see Martin
Sewell, History of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (August 2008), available at http://www.e-m-h.org/emhhistory.pdf. See also JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF
RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009). Seminal articles, in the sense that they
are generally accepted as presenting the first and most complete articulations of the efficient market
hypothesis, are Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Prices, 21 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 55
(1965); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965); and Paul A.
Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUSTRIAL
MANAGEMENT REV. 41 (1965). See also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (defining different forms of the efficient market
hypothesis).
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for risk management and trading strategies. Most importantly perhaps, an assumption of random
future price movements has permitted the modeling of such movements on the basis of normal
probability distributions, which has become the foundation for risk management strategies using
derivative financial instruments.
Indeed, it is the development of a broad range of sophisticated derivative financial
instruments, along with the provision of increased depth and liquidity of markets, which is
routinely heralded as the principal efficiency-enhancing product of financial innovation
undertaken during the prolonged period of prosperity from the mid 1980s to the present. The
current financial landscape is thus characterized by an increasingly expanded range of positions –
both long and short – in markets for the underlying assets on which derivatives are written.47 The
apparent result is a significant transformation of the relatively simplistic description of the debtfinancing function articulated by Minksy. Yet the difference in the financial landscape is
fundamentally one of degree and not one of kind.48 As a source of instability, Minsky
emphasizes the role of debt financing of capital assets. Derivative financial instruments simply
provide an enhanced ability to place bets on price movements and to replicate leveraged
positions in assets. By allowing investors to transact in asset markets at low cost, they have
provided an ability to shed risk by transferring it to parties, who are assumed to be better able to
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See Stewart Mayhew, The Impact of Derivatives on Cash Markets: What Have We Learned? (Terry
College of Business, University of Georgia, February 3, 2000), available at
http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/research/working _papers/papers/impact.pdf (surveying the empirical
literature and concluding that the evidence suggests that derivatives have either had no effect on volatility in
underlying markets or have reduced volatility and have tended to improve the liquidity of these markets as
well as the quality of information).
48

In his account of financial crises from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, Minsky notes a range of
innovations that permitted the banking sector, in particular, to avoid reserve requirements. See MINSKY,
STABILIZING, supra note 9, at 15-106; and Hyman P. Minsky, Securitization (The Levy Economics
Institute, Policy Note, 2008/2) (describing the causes and effects of securitization as an “originate and
distribute” approach to the banking function). See also Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of
the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195 (2009) (emphasizing the use of securitization by banks to
avoid capital adequacy requirements).
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bear it, as well as take on greater risk by scaling up bets on future price movements.49 But in
much the same way as the debt financing of capital assets, the resulting leverage effect –
especially in the latter instance - is an additional source of financial instability for the same
reasons identified by Minksy.
Moreover, instability associated with excessive risk taking and leverage using derivative
financial instruments may be compounded by the mismeasurement of risk.50 Despite an apparent
ill fit with the data,51 the integrity of the risk transfer market remains bound up in the efficient
market hypothesis and its assumption of random price movements;52 although it is now
increasingly recognized that this assumption is incorrect, and risk-management models that are
slavishly based on it systematically understate risk, contributing further to instability.53 In other
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See e.g., COOPER, supra note 25, at 9-14, 18 and 143-53 (drawing a link between the financial
instability hypothesis and risk-management strategies based on the efficient market hypothesis). See also
Charles J. Whalen, The U.S. Credit Crunch of 2007: A Minsky Moment (The Levy Economics Institute,
Public Policy Brief No. 92, 2007), at 12-13.
50

See e.g., Stefan Thurner, J. Doyne Farmer, & John Geanakoplos, Leverage Causes Fat Tails and
Clustered Volatility, available at http://www.arxiv.orglabs/0908.1555 (constructing a model of leveraged
asset purchases with margin calls to demonstrate that leverage causes price fluctuations to become heavy
tailed, displaying the clustered volatility characteristic of price fluctuations observed in real markets).
51

The mathematician, Benoit Mandelbrot, developed fractal geometry to describe various natural
phenomena, as well as price movements in markets for financial assets and commodities. See BENOIT
MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS: A FRACTAL
VIEW OF FINANCIAL TURBULENCE (2004) [hereinafter MANDELBROT, MISBEHAVIOR OF
MARKETS]. See also BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, FRACTALS AND SCALING IN FINANCE:
DISCONTINUITY, CONCENTRATION, RISK (1997).
52

But see Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics (CEPS Working Paper No.
91, April 2003), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/91malkiel.pdf (reviewing the
challenges to the efficient market hypothesis in the academic literature and concluding that stock markets
are more efficient and less predictable than these challenges suggest).
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MANDELBROT, MISBEHAVIOR OF MARKETS, supra note 51, at 79-107 (contrasting the wild
randomness of financial markets with the mild randomness permitted by the efficient market hypothesis).
The same general point is made by NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE
HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS (2d ed., 2004); and NASSIM
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words, risk may be mismeasured because markets for financial assets differ fundamentally from
markets for consumer goods and services. In particular, price movements in the market for
financial assets are affected by the past in the sense that they tend to exhibit positive feedback
effects;54 it is characterized by a kind of memory and the associated clustering of sharp price
movements. The positive feedback effects mean that standard probability distributions tend to
understate extremes of price movements - both positively and negatively - which can only be
captured in nonstandard distributions characterized by “fat tails” and “double peaks.”55

NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (1st ed.,
2007). See also BOOKSTABER, supra note 43, at 143-64 (characterizing the derivatives market as a
complex and tightly coupled network, attributable to the combination of liquidity and leverage, and thereby
subject to crises when all contingencies cannot be anticipated); COOPER, supra note 25, at 151-52
(observing that the risk-management industry may inadvertently encourage excessive risk taking by
producing probability distributions that are too narrow); Lux et al., supra note 4, at 4-7 (labelling as
“control illusion” the false confidence provided by mathematical risk-management models based on an
assumption of a normal probability distribution of asset price changes); and Thurner et al., supra note 50, at
4-6 (arguing that sophisticated risk-management techniques exacerbate extreme price fluctuations).
54

See e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON.
PERSP. 19 (1990) (arguing that investor demand for risky assets is affected by beliefs and sentiments which
are not justified by fundamental news and that changes in such sentiments are not fully countered by the
arbitrage trading of rational investors).
55

See e.g., Jon Danielsson, Blame the Models, 4 J. FINANCIAL STABILITY 321 (2008) (concluding that
statistical models are useful for measuring the risk of frequent small events but not systemically important
events). See also FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 39-49 (March 2009) available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Corporate/turner/index.shtml [hereinafter THE TURNER REVIEW]
(emphasizing the significance for capital adequacy requirements of the understatement of tail risk); Andrew
G. Haldane, Why Banks Failed the Stress Test (Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing, February 9-10,
2009), available at http://www.bankofengland/publications/speeches/.../speech374.pdf (identifying disaster
myopia, network externalities, and misaligned incentives as the sources of market failure that can cause
mismeasurement of market risk); and Rene M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When
Do They Happen? (Fisher College of Business, Working Paper 2008-18, October 2008) [hereinafter Stulz,
Risk Management Failures], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278073 (providing a taxonomy of risk
management failures, including the mismeasurement of known risks which can be the result of: (i) the use of
an incorrect probability distribution; (ii) mismeasurement of the correlation of returns across positions; or
(iii) mistakes in information collection).
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In sum, the source of financial instability emphasized by Minsky – excessive leverage –
is substantially magnified by the introduction of a broad range of derivative financial instruments
as both risk-creation and risk-transfer contracts in an environment characterized by
mismeasurement of asset price risk.56 In fact, Minsky‟s two theorems, which focus on the debtfinanced acquisition of capital assets, can be seen to apply analogously to transactions in
derivatives. As already noted, the development of a broad range of derivative financial
instruments has completed markets by providing economic units with desired payoffs for a broad
range of contingencies that were previously unavailable. Hedge finance units can use this
expanded range of positions to reduce their risk in risk-transfer transactions that are equivalent to
insurance. Speculative and Ponzi finance units can use the same instruments, however, to place
larger bets on price movements.57 Proprietary trading desks and some hedge funds, for example,
use sophisticated modeling techniques to identify price anomalies and the associated arbitrage
opportunities, which are seized by taking positions often using substantial amounts of leverage.58
But where price anomalies persist because of positive feedback effects, trading models can be
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See e.g., Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Fourth Quadrant: A Map of the Limit of Statistics, available at
www.edge.rog/3rd_culture/taleb08/taleb08_index.html (concluding that an analysis of the power coefficient
on data for a range of financial instruments indicates a value of between 2 and 3, with a mean absolute error
greater than 1, which has devastating consequences for predictive value).
57

See Stulz, Risk Management Failures, supra note 55, at 14 (emphasizing the need to make capital
available to cope with unknown risks that, if known and captured in the relevant models, would alter the
behavior of managers).
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Because this form of arbitrage trading provides likely small gains and a small chance of large losses, it
has been described as the equivalent of “picking up nickels in front of a bulldozer.” See ROGER
LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT 102 (2000). The phrase actually refers to “risk arbitrage” transactions, which are pure
bets on the price movements of the shares of corporations that are expected to merge. This particular
strategy differs significantly from convergence trades, relative value trades, and volatility trades, which are
hedged trading strategies based on the identification of pricing anomalies.
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subject to tracking error, and mark-to-market losses may be incurred in ever increasing size.59
The accrued losses trigger margin calls that must be met by unwinding positions, which places
further downward pressure on prices in markets that are often lacking depth. The resulting
liquidity crisis can precipitate default for speculative and Ponzi finance units employing
arbitrage-trading strategies or otherwise taking unhedged positions that are tantamount to
“naked” bets on price movements.60 As a specific example of this dynamic, the recent credit
crisis differs from other financial crises only in the nature of the risk that was transacted and
mispriced. Rather than asset price risk, credit risk was the focus of the innovative “originate and
distribute” model of banking used to extend mortgage financing to Ponzi-finance households.
The stripping of this risk and its transfer through credit default swaps was priced, however, using
models that severely underestimated it.61
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See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997) (arguing that
arbitrage trading, as conducted by a small number of specialized investors, requires capital and entails risk,
which has implications for security prices, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective when
prices diverge far from fundamental values); and Shleifer & Summers, supra note 54, at 20-23
(emphasizing the limited and risky nature of arbitrage trading in an environment dominated by changes in
price as a function of changes in sentiments and beliefs). See also Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier,
Bubbles and Crashes, 71 ECONOMETRICA 173 (2003) (presenting a model in which asset bubbles persist
despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs who are unable to coordinate selling strategies). But see
Jefferson Duarte, Francis Longstaff, & Fan Yu, Risk and Return in Fixed Income Arbitrage: Nickels in
Front of a Steamroller? 20 REV. FIN. STUDIES 769 (2005) (concluding that fixed-income arbitrage
strategies tend to yield positively-skewed supernormal returns).
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The most notable case study of this dynamic is the rise and fall of Long-Term Capital Management. See
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 58. See also NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY
OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT (2000).
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See e.g., Jan Kregel, Minsky‟s Cushions of Safety: Systemic Risk and the Crisis in the U.S. Subprime
Mortgage Market (The Levy Economics Institute, Public Policy Brief No. 93, 2008) (emphasizing that the
recent credit crisis was the result of insufficient margins of safety caused by the mispricing of risk in the US
subprime mortgage market); and Barry Eichengreen, Origins and Responses to the Crisis (October 2008) at
6, available at http://www.emlab.berkley.edu/users/webfac/.../e183.../origins_responses.pdf (noting that the
credit risk models were based on a truncated and unrepresentative sample and were misspecified in their
understatement of tail risk).
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C. MINSKY‟S POLICY AGENDA
Because of the significance of financial relations and expectations of profits that underlie
those relations, Minsky sees a sophisticated capitalist economy as inherently unstable; there is no
equilibrium, but only phases of expanding or contracting credit.62 There will be periods of
tranquility when economic units are predominantly hedge finance units; but instability is latent as
expectations of future profits become increasingly optimistic and economic units increasingly
take on debt to finance increased investment. The key aspect of Minsky‟s financial instability
hypothesis is, therefore, the notion that business cycles are the result of the internal workings of a
capitalist economy and not external shocks.63 Economies are not, as such, equilibrium seeking.
Once they tip into a debt deflation, the process feeds on itself, and government must intervene to
prop up aggregate demand and profits through deficit spending. Most importantly, the transfer
payment system provides a floor for personal income, employment, and profits. The effect of a
debt deflation on balance sheets can also cause the failure of one or more financial
intermediaries, and central banks must serve as lenders of last resort for the banking system,
providing loans and/or purchasing impaired assets64 to prevent systemic failure attributable to the
interlocking nature of relations among financial intermediaries. In discharging this function,
central banks provide a floor for asset prices. As Minsky observes, government has to be
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The same feature is emphasized by Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycle, supra note 34, with the availability of
credit determined by margin requirements.
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MINSKY, STABILIZING, supra note 9, at 172 (“...instability is determined by mechanisms within the
systems, not outside it; our economy is not unstable because it is shocked by oil, wars or monetary
surprises, but because of its nature.”). “Real business cycle theory” emphasizes external shocks, such as
technology changes, as causes of the business cycle. See e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW,
MACROECONOMICS ch. 19 (5th ed., 2003).
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But see John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle, at 1-6 and 1120 [hereinafter Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis], available at
http://www.cowles.econ.yale.edu/~gean/crisis/solving-present-crisis.pdf (outlining a more ambitious
response to the credit crisis, including initiatives intended to prop up housing prices).
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sufficiently large to discharge both of these functions.65 Instability remains, nonetheless, and is
only moderated in its effects.66 Regulatory regimes attempt to address the associated moral
hazard problem, which has been brought to the forefront of the public policy debate by the recent
credit crisis.67
In an attempt to moderate financial instability, Minsky articulates a policy agenda that is
not limited to regulatory supervision,68 although it is his emphasis on the central bank‟s lender of
last resort function as the principal stabilizing instrument in financial markets that has been
emphasized by various commentators and fleshed out in more detail.69 Minsky also advocates an
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See Davis & Stone, supra note 39 (finding that financial crises have a greater impact on expenditure and
the financing of the corporate sector in emerging economies, despite greater levels of precautionary
liquidity). See also Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy, 98 AM.
ECON. REV. 1211 (2008) (articulating a pricing theory for emerging asset classes explaining how leverage
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Hyman P. Minsky & Piero Ferri, Market Processes and Thwarting Systems (The Levy Economics
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See INT‟L MONETARY FUND, LESSONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR FUTURE
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS AND FOR LIQUIDITY
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http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020409.pdf . See also THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note
55, at 51-103.
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aggressive antitrust policy designed to limit the size of institutions in the financial sector such
that no one institution will be seen as “too big to fail.” Government would also act as employer
of last resort by providing public service employment. This role is in addition to the use of
counter-cyclical fiscal policy to prop up aggregate demand when private investment slows. But in
terms of informative detail, Minsky‟s discussion of the tax system as a fiscal policy instrument
can be ignored without any appreciable loss of important insights. Indeed, this aspect of
Minsky‟s policy agenda, which focuses primarily on the broad mix of taxes, is extremely general
and somewhat conventional.
Not surprisingly, Minksy argues that the tax system should provide government with
sufficient revenue to support aggregate demand and profits in the face of a debt deflation. To
realize this goal, he advocates a combination of a broad-based sales tax, preferably on the valueadded model, and a progressive-rate personal income tax.70 He prefers that the corporate income
tax be eliminated on the apparent assumption that it is shifted forward to consumers and is
inflationary.71 Otherwise, Minsky has very little to say regarding the second-order details of tax
design. He observes that the deductibility of corporate interest expense provides an undesirable
tax bias in favor of debt finance in the context of an otherwise unintegrated tax on equity
income.72 Without much in the way of supporting analysis, he prefers conduit treatment of
corporate income to prevent use of the corporate form as a tax-avoidance vehicle.73 With

2008) (emphasizing a focus on direct credit controls, as well as supervision and regulation). But see
Caruana, supra note 12 (noting difficulties in attempting to isolate a single variable that can reliably track
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apparent administrative and compliance costs in mind, he suggests broad application of the real
estate investment trust (“REIT”) approach whereby a corporation that has distributed a minimum
amount of its income annually is exempt from the tax that otherwise applies to nonqualifying
corporations.74 Much more interestingly, he argues that “nonproduction expenses, such as
advertising, marketing, and the pleasures of the executive suites,” should not be deductible for
corporate income tax purposes.75 In effect, these expenses are considered returns to capital and
should be treated consistently with returns to equity. He also notes, somewhat cryptically and
briefly in passing, that tax policymakers need “to consider the behavior modification aspects of
tax policy and use the expected tax avoidance reaction to foster policy goals.” 76 In this respect,
he follows the standard legal definition of tax avoidance as a modification of behavior that
legally results in a decrease or elimination of a taxed activity. Tax evasion, which is illegal, is
defined as the nonpayment of taxes while continuing to carry on a taxed activity.
As Parts IV and V attempt to illustrate, Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis can be
seen to have broad policy relevance for the resolution of certain tax-base rule choices, which
have conventionally been framed as technical tax-policy issues. In fact, that relevance goes much
deeper than was recognized by Minsky. I suggest first, however, in the following Part III, that a
greater depth of policy analysis can be realized by reframing many of these rule choices as the
subject of a tax-expenditure analysis focused on the moderation of excessive leverage and risk
taking as the sources of financial instability emphasized by Minsky.
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III.

TAX EXPENDITURES, TAX-EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, AND
CORRECTIVE TAXES

The literature on tax expenditures - both generally and in terms of analyses of particular
programs - is deep and rich. No attempt is made here to come to grips with that literature.77
Instead, this Part does nothing more than emphasize a general point that is more thoroughly
developed by Neil Brooks.78 That is, a substantial slice of the tax-expenditure literature especially the literature in the United States - has undermined the significance of the taxexpenditure concept by unnecessarily focusing on the need to classify particular rules in tax
legislation as either technical tax rules or tax expenditures. Contentiousness over the execution
of this exercise has undercut the two important functions of the tax-expenditure concept: (i) the
budgetary accounting function; and (ii) the policy analysis function. In this respect, it is
suggested below in Part III.B that the manner in which the policy case in support of a particular
provision is framed goes a long way in executing the necessary classification exercise for a broad
range of provisions without any contentiousness.79 For a minority of provisions, alternative
modes of framing will be plausible and a tax-expenditure classification can defensibly be made
for budgetary accounting purposes. Moreover, the full policy analyst‟s toolkit, encompassing
both technical and budgetary criteria, can still be usefully applied.
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Krever eds., 2009) [hereinafter Brooks, Under-Appreciated Implications]. See also Edward D. Kleinbard,
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At a more specific level relevant to the subject of this article, tax-expenditure analysis
provides a conceptual framework that suggests directions in which Minsky‟s financial instability
hypothesis might push the analysis of some important tax-base rule choices. As a tool of policy
analysis, tax-expenditure analysis may be invoked by a change in emphasis on the consequential
attributes of these rule choices attributable to the recognition of the potential significance of his
financial instability hypothesis.
A. EXECUTING THE CLASSIFICATION EXERCISE BY SPECIFYING A
BENCHMARK INCOME TAX
The tax-expenditure concept is deceptively simple. It requires the division of all rules in
a tax system into two categories: technical tax rules and tax-expenditure provisions. The first set
of rules defines the tax base, unit, period, and rate structure. The specific rules in each of these
areas form the technical structure of the system designed to raise revenue. Tax-expenditure
provisions are spending programs delivered through the tax system in the form of exceptions to
that structure; they are designed to realize certain economic or social policies otherwise
associated with comparable spending programs using alternative delivery mechanisms.
Although politicians and policymakers have long recognized that governments spend
through the tax system,80 the tax-expenditure concept was not developed in detail until the 1960s
and early 1970s by Stanley Surrey,81 who popularized the concept, coined the phrase, and wrote
two definitive works on the subject.82 According to Surrey, much of the debate about specific tax
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See e.g., Neil Brooks, Current Tax Reading – Review of Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, TAX
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Comparison, 33 TAX NOTES 201, 203-04 (1986) (describing the development of the tax-expenditure
concept in Germany in the 1950s).
82
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31

provisions and their reform is really an issue of spending reform. The tax-expenditure concept
allows the debate to be joined in terms of budgetary criteria relevant to such reform. From the
outset of its development, however, the tax-expenditure concept has been contentious.
Proponents have argued that the concept helps to clarify the size of government spending while
also providing an analytical tool to assess the desirability of particular rules formally embedded
in tax legislation. Critics have emphasized the problematic nature of a perceived need to identify
a benchmark tax system as a premise for characterization of deviations as equivalent to spending
programs.
The genesis of this definitional debate is undoubtedly the related critiques of the
comprehensive tax base and the tax-expenditure concept articulated by Boris Bittker at the outset
of the development of both.83 Beginning with Bittker, critics of the tax-expenditure concept have
argued that the Haig-Simons concept of income,84 which the comprehensive tax base is seen to
operationalize, is too difficult to translate into a workable norm. Furthermore, it says nothing
about certain issues, such as the appropriate tax unit. In response, some proponents of the taxexpenditure concept have rejected the Haig-Simons concept of income in favor of a benchmark
tax structure expressed in terms of what is “widely accepted by tax analysts.” 85 Others have
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vigorously defended the Haig-Simons concept of income as the basis for characterizing particular
rules as tax expenditures, thereby triggering an accounting and analysis as spending programs.86
The lingering effects of the conceptual noise created by this perceived need to identify
the elements of a benchmark tax system are evident in a recent report on tax expenditures
prepared by the Staff of the US Joint Committee on Taxation.87 In an attempt to avoid the
characterization problems of the past, the Joint Committee report introduces what is described as
“a new paradigm for classifying tax provisions as tax expenditures.”88 In particular, the report
proposes use of the existing provisions of US income tax law as the reference point for
classification purposes, which is supposed to avoid contentiousness surrounding the articulation
of a theoretically pure benchmark. The report proposes that tax provisions be characterized as tax
expenditures if they can be considered either:
deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (referred
to as “tax subsidies”); or
a structural element of the Internal Revenue Code that “materially affect[s] economic
decisions in a manner that imposes substantial efficiency costs” (referred to as “taxinduced structural distortions”).89
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See also Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187,
212, 228-30 (2004) [hereinafter Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures] (suggesting a separate category for
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http://www.treasury.govt.nz>...>PolicyPerspectivesPapers>2009.

33

After reviewing the historical development of tax-expenditure analysis in the United
States, as well as the standard critiques of it, the Joint Committee report elaborates this proposed
taxonomy in some detail, including a discussion of three subcategories of tax subsidies: (i) tax
transfers; (ii) social spending; and (iii) business synthetic spending. The report emphasizes the
use of the tax-expenditure concept as an analytical tool, with the proposed approach to
characterization intended to allow tax-expenditure analysis to serve “as an effective and neutral
analytical tool for policymakers in their consideration of individual proposals or larger tax
reforms.”90 This emphasis is much different than that in other countries where the taxexpenditure concept is used primarily as a weak budgetary accounting tool.91 The Joint
Committee report downplays this role, perhaps because of the apparent failure of the taxexpenditure account to control US federal government spending.92 Yet, the tax-expenditure
concept may well have its singularly independent policy significance in performing a budgetary
accounting function, with characterization problems being much less problematic when the
concept is limited to this role.
Perhaps more importantly - given the stated goal of the Joint Committee report to
enhance the analytical function of the tax-expenditure concept - it is unclear whether the
suggested characterization approach really does much to advance the whole tax-expenditure
enterprise as a policymaking tool. In short, because the suggested categories are in no way self
executing, it is not obvious that the proposed frame of reference solves what is assumed to be an
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insoluble problem.93 In fact, the proposed taxonomy of tax expenditures appears to be based on
the incorrect premise that characterization as a tax-expenditure provision accomplishes nothing
unique for analytical purposes. An assumption of tax-policy agnosticism on this characterization
issue is presumably advocated as a means to free policymakers to posit any set of rule choices,
with the possibilities assessed on the basis of their efficiency and distributional effects, as well as
administrative and compliance costs. Labeling a particular rule as a tax-expenditure provision
apparently does nothing to advance this necessary policy analysis of the consequential attributes
of possible rule choices.
It is more than just a bit ironic, however, that, as a means to enhance the analytical
function, any difference in policy analysis triggered by a tax-expenditure characterization is
deemphasized, which necessarily reduces the significance of the classification exercise. But
technical tax-policy analysis and tax-expenditure analysis, albeit focused on the same
consequential attributes, remain decidedly different because of a decidedly different emphasis on
those attributes. It is this difference in emphasis that is central to the classification exercise when
government discharges its allocative function using a particular policy instrument.94 Adopting the
taxonomy suggested in the Joint Committee report, a tax-induced structural distortion is only
sensibly included as a tax expenditure if the associated behavioral response is intended by
policymakers. Indeed, “deliberate inconsistency with an identifiable general rule of the present
law” as indicative of a tax subsidy can only be determined if it can be concluded that the
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behavioral response at issue is one that is intended by policymakers. The concept of a benchmark
income tax base – however it may be conceived - is utterly irrelevant to this classification
exercise.
B. EMPHASIZING BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE IN THE PRESENCE OF MARKET
FAILURE
Brooks observes that there are two general problems with a perceived need to define a
benchmark income tax system as the gateway to classification of particular rules as tax
expenditures.95 First, it is not clear what normative principles underlie such a system. Second,
even if such a principle could be identified, operationalizing it involves balancing political and
administrative considerations. These problems were similarly emphasized by Bittker and, as
Brooks notes, they do not in any way undermine the usefulness of the tax-expenditure concept,
which, as a form of conceptual reasoning, does not depend on “an empirical or normative
judgment.”96 Disputes about the precise dividing line between technical tax rules and taxexpenditure provisions do not mean, therefore, that the concept is incoherent and cannot serve its
purpose of promoting clarity of thought;97 yet this important point has been buried in the needless
debate over a benchmark tax system and the execution of the characterization exercise as a
trigger for the accounting and analytical functions associated with the tax-expenditure concept.
Indeed, it is arguable that Bittker‟s original point has been lost with the passage of time and the
volume of subsequent literature on the tax-expenditure concept; or worse, it has been misstated
in its significance.
Although well intentioned, traditional defenses of the tax-expenditure concept, grounded
in the comprehensive tax base tradition, mistakenly tend to mask the significance of the
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consequential attributes associated with various rule choices as the basis for a necessary
distinction between technical tax rules and tax-expenditure provisions.98 Although both technical
tax-policy and tax-expenditure analyses involve consideration of the same consequential
attributes, the emphasis is different, particularly where a tax-expenditure program is chosen by
government in discharging its allocative function. As Shaviro suggests,99 tax-rule choices that are
seen as part of the technical architecture under an income tax tend to be made with a focus on the
distributional aspects, while balancing them against administrative and compliance cost, as well
as efficiency effects. These other consequential attributes are thus decidedly secondary in
importance. In fact, many of the features of a Haig-Simons or comprehensive tax base are
presumably preferred because of the perceived distributional effects. Revenue is ideally raised in
a distributionally appealing manner at the lowest possible administrative and compliance cost,
with tolerable efficiency costs attributable to behavioral response to the change in price
occasioned by the particular tax rule. All else being equal perhaps, the rule that changes behavior
least should be preferred because of its smaller deadweight loss. But as Bittker emphasized early
on,100 there are many rule choices that involve ambiguous distributional effects. In these
instances, considerations of administration and compliance, along with tax politics and possible
behavioral response, tend to move to the forefront of policy analysis.
Where a tax rule is chosen as an instrument to induce a behavioral response, the
emphasis of the associated policy analysis obviously changes. Shaviro argues,101 for example,
that the government in this instance is discharging its allocative function, and distributional
effects are decidedly secondary. This altered emphasis requires policymakers to invoke
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37

budgetary criteria in assessing the particular rule choice that is intended to induce the behavioral
response. In effect, the analysis of the associated efficiency effects is no longer framed in terms
of deadweight loss. A market failure requiring government spending in the form of the posited
tax benefit must be identified,102 and the welfare gain associated with the intended behavioral
response should be estimated and weighed against the expected cost of providing the benefit
measured as the sum of:
administrative costs; and
windfall gains attributable to the delivery of benefits to economic units who would
engage in the desired behavior irrespective of the availability of any such benefits.
This quantitative targeting feature will be a function, in part at least, of the qualitative
targeting aspects of the tax-rule choice. Over-inclusiveness will result in costs in the form of
inframarginal gains. Under-inclusiveness will result in a range of economic units being excluded
from the provision of benefits even though their behavior would be affected in the intended
manner. In terms of rule choice, delivery of the program through the tax system should be
compared with alternative policy instruments independent of the tax system,103 since it is not a
choice among alternative tax rules. Finally, the program itself – irrespective of the choice of
delivery mechanism - should be assessed in terms of the government‟s policy and spending
priorities.
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The characterization of a particular rule embedded in the income tax system as either a
tax-expenditure provision or a technical tax rule can thus be seen as contingent on its rationale.
This point was emphasized some time ago by McIntyre,104 who argues that the tax system does
not have to be unambiguously divided into technical tax rules and tax expenditures. If a
particular rule is (or has been) justified as a spending provision, it should be analyzed as a
spending program. As a means of conceptual reasoning, the tax-expenditure concept should be
invoked whenever a rule embedded in the tax system is intended (or can be seen to be intended)
to induce a particular behavioral response to correct a market failure, and government is thereby
performing its allocative function. Where the classification of a particular rule might otherwise
be contentious, McIntyre‟s classification paradigm errs on the side of a tax-expenditure
characterization on the presumption that the provision of additional budgetary accounting
information is useful, while enriching the policy analysis can only enhance discharge of the
policymaking function. McIntyre‟s approach to the articulation of the tax-expenditure concept
also embraces what are sometimes referred to as “negative tax expenditures”105 as a class of rules
that do not provide a tax benefit for particular behavior but impose an additional tax or tax
penalty. Such provisions are commonly intended to correct a market failure by increasing the
cost of the targeted behavior and are nothing more than Pigouvian corrective taxes; they should
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be analyzed in the same manner as tax expenditures generally because they are intended (or can
be seen to be intended) to induce a behavioral response.
By reconsidering the justification for some selected provisions that are commonly seen
as technical tax rules, Parts IV and V illustrate the contingent nature of tax-expenditure
classification and analysis emphasized by McIntyre. With moderation of excessive leverage and
risk taking as the policy goal, it is suggested that some provisions can be framed as tax subsidies
while others can be framed as corrective taxes. More particularly, tax-expenditure analysis
moves the assessment away from a focus on consistency of tax treatment along the relevant
behavioral margins to a focus on inconsistency as a means to bias behavior. Many provisions that
are conventionally characterized as part of the technical tax structure can be characterized as tax
expenditures intended to induce particular behavioral responses in the presence of market failure,
with much the same result in terms of rule choice supported by familiar technical tax-policy
arguments. These arguments are especially important, given that a tax-expenditure
characterization of various rule choices highlights a significant targeting problem: that is, an
inability to precisely calibrate the required amount of any tax subsidy or corrective tax. However,
taxation clearly plays a secondary role to the use of regulatory instruments on the supply side of
capital markets as a means to moderate excessive leverage and risk taking. This secondary role
may mean that the quantitative targeting dimension is not as severe as it would be if a tax-based
instrument were chosen as the principal instrument.106 Moreover, much of the qualitative
targeting dimension can be adequately executed. At a minimum, many of the practical
considerations that have been seen to justify the particular tax-rule choices receive some
enhancement from the application of tax-expenditure analysis.

106
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At the price of some confusion, therefore, the following two Parts slide back and forth
between technical tax-policy analysis and tax-expenditure analysis in assessing tax-rule choices
for the treatment of: (i) returns to corporate debt and equity; (ii) losses; and (iii) interest expense
of individuals. It is hoped that this admittedly confusing mode of analysis illustrates the need for
flexibility in the use of both sets of policy tools in areas where the line between technical tax
rules and tax-expenditure provisions is somewhat blurred.
IV.

DIVIDEND IMPUTATION SYSTEMS, CORPORATE CAPITAL
STRUCTURE, AND MARGINS OF SAFETY

In the context of an explicit policy goal of moderation of financial instability, the taxpolicy literature highlights a tax bias in favor of corporate debt, which is characteristic of most
corporate income tax systems, as the most significant tax distortion requiring reform.107 Moving
from a conventional micro to a macro focus, this tax bias is seen to induce an excessive level of
debt in the corporate sector generally, which leaves it vulnerable to economic downturns. A taxrule choice that realizes complete consistency of treatment of returns to debt and equity finance
would eliminate this instability-breeding bias. Depending on the particular parameters, a tax-rule
choice that realizes something less than complete consistency of these same returns would mute,
but not eliminate, the same bias. In an effort to realize complete consistency of tax treatment, the
IMF paper, for example, advocates adoption of an allowance for corporate equity (“ACE”)
system108 as a preferred reform option; it is reluctant, however, to go further and recommend use
of a tax penalty for debt finance, presumably because of the difficulty determining the
appropriate level of such a penalty that would force firms to internalize the negative spillover
effects associated with excessive leverage. By eliminating the tax bias for debt financing, it is
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apparently assumed that a range of otherwise suboptimal investments will be forgone, with a
reduction in the level of corporate leverage as an important secondary benefit. It is also
apparently assumed that elimination of a tax bias in favor of corporate debt will induce a range of
corporations to maintain stable hedge-finance states.
In advocating a strong form of consistent tax treatment, the IMF paper ignores some
important policy constraints associated with the presence of tax exempts and nonresident
investors. These constraints mean that realization of consistent treatment for the entire range of
investors is unrealistic, leaving a compromised application of dividend imputation systems as the
preferred alternative to the double taxation of equity returns under classical corporate income tax
systems. This compromised application manifests itself in two principal respects:
maintenance of a debt tax bias for tax-exempt and nonresident investors; and
provision of an equity tax bias for a range of taxable investors.
This Part suggests that the latter can be framed as a tax-expenditure program intended to
promote maintenance of margins of safety. But this bias must be supported with a comprehensive
deductibility limitation for corporate interest expense, which is the necessary tax penalty
analogous to a corrective tax for debt finance under dividend imputation systems with incomplete
consistency of taxation of debt and equity returns as a persistent feature in the presence of taxexempt and nonresident investors.
A. INCONSISTENT TAXATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY RETURNS AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF CORPORATE/INVESTOR RATE RELATIONSHIPS
Standard country practice permits the accrual-based deduction of corporate interest
expense while requiring the inclusion of interest income by debtholders on the same basis.
Dividends are non-deductible for issuers and are taxable to shareholders, with or without credit
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for corporate tax paid on the underlying income.109 Taking this different treatment as a given, the
IMF paper provides a succinct review of the rate relationships that are the source of a tax bias in
favor of debt for a range of investors. In fact, the parameters of these relationships are the subject
of a deep corporate finance literature110 on the theory of an optimal capital structure which
lowers the after-tax cost of capital and maximizes shareholder wealth through the judicious use
of debt. This literature begins with the work of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller111 (“MM”)
and their fundamental insight stated in the form of the following proposition: In the absence of
taxes, the value of a corporation is independent of its capital structure, and corporate debt policy
is irrelevant. Their irrelevance proposition follows from two simple premises: first, that the value
of a corporation is equal to the present value of the expected cash flows from its assets; and,
second, that the relative mix of debt and equity securities divides those expected cash flows
among investors. Accordingly, the sum of the present value of the expected cash flows associated
with the outstanding debt and equity securities of a corporation must equal the present value of
the expected cash flows associated with the underlying corporate assets. Critical to this
proposition is a requirement of perfect capital markets (for example, the absence of information
asymmetries) and a resultant insensitivity as between the investment policy of a corporation and
its borrowing policy.112 Under those conditions, the value of two corporations with the same asset
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profile must be equivalent, whatever their mix of debt and equity securities. This equivalence
holds because any alteration of the risk and return mix realized by an alteration of the relative
mix of corporate-level debt and equity can be replicated by investors through the substitution of
investor-level debt for corporate-level debt. Investors will not pay a premium for shares of
corporations with capital structures that have a mix of debt and equity, since any changes in the
mix of corporate-level debt and equity securities are only changes in portfolio composition.113
As emphasized by MM, the introduction of taxes alters their analysis, primarily because
of a tax bias in favor of corporate debt which can be used to lower the after-tax cost of capital.114
In particular, the deductibility of interest expense permits the distribution of corporate income
free of the corporate-level tax. Because of this shield from the corporate income tax provided by
the interest expense deduction, corporate debt generates an increased after-tax return and lower
cost of capital; in an important sense, the tax shield is an asset that adds value to a corporation
and induces the issue of more debt than would otherwise occur in a world without taxes. An
extensive literature115 is important, however, for its emphasis on the more complex rate
relationships that determine whether, in the aggregate, there is: (i) a tax bias in favor of debt or
equity; and (ii) an optimal capital structure for particular corporations. In general, the focus of
this literature is the expansion of the original MM analysis to account for the effect of investorlevel taxes on debt and equity returns, as well as the impact of different effective corporate tax
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rates. To some extent, these additional factors operate to reduce and/or offset the present value of
the tax shield from the corporate interest deduction, which reduces the tax bias in favor of debt.
But even after accounting for differences in corporate and investor-level tax rates, there remains
a general tax bias in favor of debt which arises largely because the investor-level tax on interest
income is less than the two levels of tax on equity income for a range of investors.116 The present
value of the tax shield provided by the corporate interest deduction is sufficient, therefore, to
induce corporations to issue more debt than they would in the absence of income taxes. The
equilibrium point at which the present value of the tax shield equals the tax rate of the marginal
investor is, in a general sense, drawn at a point that indicates a tax preference for corporate debt
for a range of investors.
As explanations of this equilibrium, the trade off and agency theories of corporate capital
structure posit that debt is issued to the point that direct and indirect costs of financial distress
are equal to or less than the value of the associated tax shield.117 In effect, the tax advantage
associated with the deductibility of corporate interest expense induces a substitution of debt for
equity to the point that the instruments are no longer perfect substitutes, and the substitution is
considered inefficient because of the related nontax costs – both direct and indirect. Direct costs
consist of the administrative and legal costs incurred in bankruptcy or a comparable legal
proceeding that is invoked as the mechanism governing the orderly breakup or reorganization of
an insolvent corporation.118 Indirect costs consist of the more intangible costs associated with
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difficulties encountered in the operation of a corporation as a going concern or in financial
distress short of bankruptcy proceedings. These costs include the inefficiencies associated with
asset substitution and underinvestment, which occur because of shareholders‟ decisions to pursue
risky investments with zero or negative present values, as well as their decisions to forgo
investments that would otherwise add value to a corporation.
In an attempt to prevent potential gaming by shareholders, creditors typically require
restrictions and covenants limiting actions that might be detrimental to the value of the issued
debt. Negotiation of these more complex contracts involves legal and administrative costs, along
with monitoring costs incurred to ensure that the specified restrictions are observed. In this
respect, Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis posits that the necessary calibration of the
nontax costs associated with debt financing fails during a period of prolonged prosperity, with a
range of borrowers and their lenders overstating the adequacy of margins of safety as they move
from hedge finance to speculative and/or Ponzi finance states.119 With understatement of the
associated nontax costs of debt finance, a tax bias for corporate interest expense is problematic
as a further impetus to excessive risk taking.120 Although it is now recognized that excessive
leverage can be seen as a negative externality at a macro level,121 the focus of the tax-policy

Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337 (1977) (examining eleven railroad
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literature has been the firm-level distortion of investment that arises because of the negative cost
of capital attributable to the combination of the corporate interest expense deduction and
accelerated depreciation. In this tax environment, investments that are not profitable in the
absence of taxes become profitable because of the tax system.
As noted above, the ACE system is preferred in the IMF paper as one particular approach
that realizes consistency of treatment of the returns on corporate debt and equity and thereby
equalizes the after-tax cost of both forms of capital. Under the ACE system, the corporate
interest expense deduction is maintained, and a normal return is imputed on equity for
deductibility purposes. This return, as well as interest income, is exempt for holders; any return
in excess of the normal rate is subject to tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels. The
ACE system is thus a non-distortive tax on economic rents, with consumption tax treatment of
normal returns.122 But as acknowledged in the IMF paper, there is only limited country
experience with the ACE system,123 which presents some difficult technical issues, including
transitional problems and inconsistency with the much different premises of the international tax
status quo.124 Perhaps most importantly, the extension of interest imputation to equity capital for
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deductibility purposes entails revenue loss, primarily because of the presence of tax-exempt and
nonresident investors.125 This revenue loss has tended to make the ACE system impractical in the
presence of a budget constraint.
Denial of the corporate interest expense deduction is an obvious tax-reform alternative
which attempts to realize consistency of treatment of returns to debt and equity while moderating
revenue effects. This approach is developed most completely in the 1992 U.S. Treasury
department study126 proposing a comprehensive business income tax (“CBIT”). For various
reasons, including its taxation of debt returns to tax exempts, the CBIT system is also
problematic.127 The Nordic dual income taxes (“DITs”), which are probably the closest
operationalization of a CBIT system, attempt to manage some of these problems by maintaining

the same problems. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Business Enterprise Tax: A First Appraisal, 118 TAX
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the corporate interest expense deduction and applying the corporate income tax on equity income
either as a final tax (exemption at the shareholder level) or as a withholding tax (dividend
imputation approach). In fact, as a particular expression of a CBIT system, the Nordic DITs have
received considerable support in the tax-policy literature.128 Much of their attractiveness lies,
however, in the application of a single rate to all forms of capital income,129 which permits the
use of an interest withholding tax on deductible interest expense. The benefits of this single-rate
structure are largely forgone where exceptions must be made for tax-exempt and nonresident
investors, with a zero rate applied to their interest income returns and the single rate for capital
income applied to equity returns through nonrefundability of dividend imputation credits. Where
these features are maintained, much of the attractiveness of a DIT system is undermined, and it
tends to converge with existing dividend imputation systems in its realization of an incomplete
consistency of taxation of debt and equity returns.
It is suggested below in Part IV.B that this incomplete consistency of treatment of the
returns to corporate debt and equity, which is characteristic of most dividend imputation systems,
can be seen as a preferred tax-rule choice when policymakers move from the standard micro
focus that has informed tax-policy analysis to a tax-expenditure perspective focused on excessive
leverage at a macro level. In short, what is commonly viewed as a weakness of dividend
imputation systems, but a necessary concession to revenue, administration, and compliance
considerations, looks much different when viewed in this different policy light. It may even be
appropriate to provide a preferential tax rate for share gains as a means to support a retention
bias.
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B. INCOMPLETE CONSISTENCY UNDER DIVIDEND IMPUTATION SYSTEMS AND
MAINTENANCE OF MARGINS OF SAFETY
Dividend imputation systems ideally ensure that only the shareholder-level tax is
ultimately paid on distributed equity income, and the tax system is consistent in its treatment of
the returns to debt and equity. This condition holds provided that the corporate income tax rate
and the highest marginal personal income tax rate are equivalent, and shareholders receive full
imputation credits for corporate tax on the underlying income from which dividends are paid.
Under these strict parameters, a dividend imputation system ensures that the corporate income
tax operates as a withholding tax on equity income, and there is no preference for debt or equity
finance.130 To varying degrees and for various reasons, however, national tax policymakers have
failed to realize complete consistency of the returns to equity and debt for a range of investors.
Although the policy pieces tend to be seen as the result of discrete technical tax-policy
considerations, I suggest that the ostensibly incoherent whole can be rationalized as a taxexpenditure program intended promote maintenance of margins of safety in the corporate sector.
The IMF paper does not discuss dividend imputation systems in any detail, presumably
because of certain structural features that combine to undermine consistency of treatment of debt
and equity returns.131 Three important features with this effect are:
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limitation of imputation credits to taxable resident shareholders of domestic
corporations;
provision of unfunded imputation credits computed as a function of statutory corporate
income tax rates rather than effective rates; and
adoption of a statutory corporate income tax rate that is lower than the highest marginal
personal income tax rate.
For a range of taxable investors, each of these features lowers the tax rate on equity
income and provides a preference for such investment over debt. Although this equity bias tends
to be accepted by national tax policymakers as the tolerable outcome of structural
compromises,132 it may also be justified on tax-expenditure grounds. As an illustrative example
of this kind of policy flexibility, limitation of the Canadian dividend tax credit (“DTC”) to
resident individuals holding shares of “taxable Canadian corporations”133 has sometimes been
justified on technical tax-policy grounds and sometimes on the basis of two related subsidy
rationales.134 One subsidy rationale posits that the DTC is provided as a necessary stimulus for
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investment in Canadian corporations. Proponents of this view apparently believe that, by
reducing the burden of the double taxation of corporate income, the DTC should lead to
increased equity investment in the Canadian corporate sector. This result is presumably achieved
through an increase in the after-tax return on dividend income, which is assumed to translate into
increased savings, a lower cost of capital, and increased growth. 135 A related subsidy rationale
posits that the DTC is provided to encourage Canadian share ownership. This result presumably
occurs because of the reduction in personal income tax provided by the DTC, which serves as an
incentive for resident individuals to purchase shares of Canadian corporations, with assumed
spillover benefits. Yet this very same feature of the DTC – limitation to resident individuals
holding shares of taxable Canadian corporation – has also been justified as a technical design
feature. In particular, the unavailability of the DTC for tax exempts and nonresidents is
sometimes supported on the basis of the prohibitive revenue cost of extending the credit on a
refundable basis to these shareholders.136 Similarly, provision of dividend imputation credits on
an unfunded basis – that is, provision on an assumed amount of corporate tax paid as a function
of the statutory rate - has also been justified on technical tax-policy grounds, such as

DTC as a technical tax provision. But see Robin Boadway, The Annual Tax Expenditure Account – A
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administrative simplicity; or, alternatively, as a means of allowing the benefit of corporate losses
and tax incentives to be passed on to shareholders as a tax subsidy, with the lower effective tax
rate reflected in an assumed lower cost of equity capital.
Consistent with these other compromised features of dividend imputation systems,
adoption of a statutory corporate tax rate that is lower than the highest marginal personal rate
may also be rationalized as the outcome of technical tax-policy considerations or as a taxexpenditure provision. With respect to the former rationale, competition for mobile direct
investment has placed considerable downward pressure on corporate tax rates. The result of this
trend is that the statutory rate in many countries is lower than the shareholder-level tax rate for a
range of investors. This rate gap provides the benefit of deferral through the retention of equity
income at the corporate level.137 As a function of tax competition, the gap is commonly seen as a
technical design issue,138 and - given an inability to stem pressure on the corporate tax rate some reformers argue that it should be closed though a combination of base-broadening measures
under the personal income tax and a lowering of the highest personal marginal rate.139 But the
rate gap can be framed, instead, in terms of a tax-expenditure rationale that is especially
important for the promotion of maintenance of margins of safety. The Canadian experience is
again instructive.
A lower statutory corporate tax rate has long been provided on a targeted basis for
Canadian-controlled private corporations (“CCPCs”) on a specified maximum amount of annual
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income from an active business carried on in Canada.140 This lower rate of corporate tax, and the
retention bias it entails where the shareholder tax rate is higher, has sometimes been justified as a
technical tax-policy provision intended realize consistency of tax treatment between closely-held
corporations and the unincorporated sector with which such corporations are seen to compete. 141
The same lower rate of corporate tax has also been justified, however, as a tax subsidy that is
intended either:
to correct for an equity capital market bias faced by closely-held corporations that are
small to medium in size;142 or
to capture perceived spillover benefits associated with this sector.
Since it extends equally to the income of widely-held corporations and the income of
closely-held corporations subject to the same general corporate rate, the retention bias that is the
result of downward pressure on statutory corporate tax rates from international tax competition is
obviously much broader in its effect. Any tax-expenditure rationale probably must change,
therefore, from an attempt to correct for equity capital market biases, or to capture spillover
benefits, to a perceived need to promote maintenance of margins of safety at the corporate level
generally. In the context of closely-held corporations, a significant offsetting effect is a
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distributional one, with higher-income individuals benefiting disproportionately from the deferral
benefit associated with the lower rate. In the context of widely-held corporations, an offsetting
effect is perceived agency costs arising in the form of managerial “cash burning.”143 In other
words, efficiency losses can result because earnings retention may be preferred for tax purposes
even though, for nontax purposes, investors would be better off receiving the earnings in the
form of dividends and reinvesting the after-tax amount in projects with greater expected
returns.144 The distributional effect can be addressed, in the worst instances at least, by imposing
a refundable tax approximating the highest marginal personal rate on retained income that is not
reinvested in an active business.145 The agency cost effect may be addressed through corporate
governance innovations - both regulatory and market based.146 It is nonetheless unclear whether
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The apparent need to control agency costs attributable to corporate management‟s control of excess cash
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signalling function served by dividend payments is the focus of a substantial literature on the desirability of
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Kim Brooks, Learning To Live with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the Corporate Tax 36 UBC L. REV.
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Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995). But see also Michael C. Doran, Managers,
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interests of shareholders, corporate managers, and third parties in the debate over the desirability of
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See the refundable dividend tax on hand (“RDTOH”) mechanism in ITA, section 129. Much the same
problem arises under the Nordic DITs. The lower rate on capital income means that an imputed return on
equity capital must be determined for small businesses, both incorporated and unincorporated, which
combine the capital and labor inputs of the participants. In effect, the imputed return operates as an upper
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See e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 143 (emphasizing the use of debt to reduce free cash flow
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Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 61 (1989) (defending the use of high-yield debt
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these offsetting effects can be sufficiently muted to warrant provision of a retention bias as a
means of promoting maintenance of margins of safety and a hedge finance state at the firm level.
Because acceptance of a corporate/shareholder rate gap may be the more broadly effective taxrule choice to realize this goal, these offsetting effects are especially significant.
By lowering the cost of equity capital and inducing the issue of new equity capital, the
provision of dividend imputation credits for resident shareholders on an unfunded basis may also
be rationalized as an attempt to promote maintenance of margins of safety rather than increased
domestic ownership of the domestic corporate sector or increased output by that sector.
Whatever the particular subsidy rationale, the desired effect may be substantially diluted where
national capital markets are well integrated with international capital markets and are relatively
small in the sense that the domestic savings rate has virtually no impact on world interest rates.147
These conditions mean that the cost of finance for a range of domestic corporations is determined
by international capital markets independent of the level of domestic savings. As a result, any
increase in the level of domestic savings because of personal income tax reductions may simply
result in a reduction in the level of foreign savings invested in domestic corporations or an
increase in the level of domestic savings invested in foreign assets. The dominant effect of a
limitation of dividend imputation credits to resident investors may thus be a portfolio shift by
residents away from debt and into shares of domestic corporations, with nonresidents shifting
away from shares of the same corporations. Any stabilizing effect at the corporate level would be
realized at the cost of an offsetting assumption of additional risk by households, while providing

in leveraged buy outs in the 1980s). For a reprise of this argument in the context of the high-yield,
subordinated junk debt used in income-trust structures in Canada, see Benjamin Alarie & Edward M.
Iacobucci, Tax Policy, Capital Structure, and Income Trusts, 45 CAN. BUS. L.J. 1 (2007).
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See Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, Problems with Integrating Corporate and Personal Taxes in an
Open Economy, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 39 (1992); and GOV‟T PROV. ONT., FAIR TAXATION IN A
CHANGING WORLD: REPORT OF THE ONTARIO FAIR TAX COMMISSION 343 (1993) (Ont.)
(recommending restructuring or repeal of the provincial portion of the DTC in the face of increasing
integration of capital markets).
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dubious spillover benefits associated with “national” share ownership.148 These kinds of
offsetting portfolio shifts would arguably occur most readily with large multinational
corporations whose shares trade internationally. Viewed in the best possible subsidy light,
therefore, limitation of dividend imputation credits to resident individuals may help to reduce
equity capital market biases for small and medium-sized domestic corporations that are closely
held. For those corporations, dividend imputation can actually result in an increase in the total
amount of their equity capital149 and, through a consequent reduction in their reliance on debt
finance, an increase in their margins of safety.
In fact, the revenue imperative associated with the provision of refundable credits for
tax-exempt and nonresident investors is probably the more compelling basis for the limitation of
dividend imputation credits to taxable resident shareholders of domestic corporations. As an
incidental effect, denial of imputation credits for tax exempts and nonresidents can mute demand
for dividend distributions and reinforce a retention bias with its maintenance of margins of
safety.150 Ideally, a focus on reinforcement of this bias dictates adoption of an advance
corporation tax (“ACT”) applicable to dividend distributions to ensure that imputation credits are
available only to the extent of actual tax paid. At its most fundamental level, an ACT attempts to
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(surveying the mixed evidence for the open-economy model and suggesting that the capital market in
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By segmenting shareholders, dividend streaming delivers the benefit of tax shielding of corporate
income to those shareholders who value it most. Dividend streaming is a significant problem for dividend
imputation systems and has required specific anti-avoidance legislation. See e.g., Mark P. Gergen, How
Corporate Integration Could Kill the Market for Corporate Tax Shelters, 61 TAX L. REV. 145 (2008)
(observing that the provision of full integration through, for example, refundable imputation credits causes
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limit the benefit of corporate tax expenditures, as well as any mismeasurement of income through
the use of financial accounting conventions, to retained earnings.151 Washing out of the value of
corporate tax preferences and income mismeasurement on distribution is usually based on the
empirical premise that the delivery of corporate tax preferences is not sufficiently enhanced
through a lower cost of capital associated with the flow through to shareholders. With correction
of excessive risk taking through excessive leverage as the policy goal, the associated retention
bias is the more important effect. But national tax policymakers must still determine that the
administrative and compliance costs associated with an ACT are less than the benefits
attributable to such a bias.152
Denial of imputation credits for tax-exempt and nonresident investors means, of course,
that a tax bias in favor of corporate debt continues to hold for such investors. In the absence of a
generalized rule of nondeductibility for corporate interest expense, this debt tax bias may be
addressed by comprehensive thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules.153 This particular
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Adoption of an ACT to wash out corporate level preferences on distribution of tax-preferred income may
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For a review of some of the relevant issues, see Edgar, Integration Canadian Style, supra note 134, at
1240-44. An especially contentious policy issue is the treatment of foreign-source income earned by
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legislative response is noted only briefly in the IMF paper and is criticized as ad hoc in nature.154
The characterization may be attributable to the fact that the rationale for and design details of
existing regimes vary considerably. Even so, there are two emerging trends in such legislation
which potentially give it some conceptual coherence.155 One trend is a move away from a focus
on the use of related-party debt as disguised equity in favor of an application to all debt – both
related-party and arm‟s-length debt – in an effort to limit the deductibility of corporate interest
expense within a specified leverage ratio. Another trend is a move away from a focus on inbound
direct investment to either:
symmetrical application in the context of outbound and inbound direct investment; or
application equally in a purely domestic context and a cross-border context (both
inbound and outbound).
In the cross-border context, application of thin capitalization legislation to all debt of a
corporation can be rationalized as an attempt to limit the tax-driven sourcing of the interest
expense of multinational corporate groups in the context of both inbound and outbound direct
investment. In the purely domestic context, similar application of thin capitalization legislation
can be rationalized as an attempt to moderate the tax bias in favor of debt for a range of
investors, including tax exempts and private-equity funds.156

legislative regimes differ in some important respects. For a comparison of these different features, see Tim
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The extension in some EU countries of interest deductibility restrictions to arm‟s-length debt has been
motivated by the European Court of Justice‟s characterization of thin capitalization regimes that are limited
to related-party debt in the context of inbound direct investment as a violation of the right to freedom of
establishment under the EC Treaty. See Christoph Kaserer, Restricting Interest Deductions in Corporate
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Although the associated rationale differs depending on the context, the different
rationales do not mean that thin capitalization legislation is ad hoc in nature. Indeed, a
comprehensive application of thin capitalization legislation to limit the deduction of corporate
interest expense within a specified leverage ratio can comprehensively constrain the scope of a
tax bias in favor of debt finance and support maintenance of margins of safety at the firm level. A
difficult targeting issue is the specification of an acceptable leverage ratio. Admittedly, there will
be an element of arbitrariness in the choice of a specified ratio at the firm level, with particular
industry mean or median ratios serving as rough benchmarks.157 Moreover, with the possible
exception of the financial sector - where regulatory capital ratios can be used for tax purposes any correlation between a targeted macro limitation on credit creation as indicative of declining
margins of safety and the results produced by aggregate leverage ratios at the firm level, as
constrained by comprehensive thin capitalization legislation, will also be somewhat random.158 In
effect, specification of a permissible leverage ratio at the firm level can produce defensible
results at a macro level, albeit entirely incidentally.159 Because it is less sensitive to changes in
asset value and earnings, thin capitalization legislation that is intended, at least in part, to

capitalization and earnings-stripping legislation applicable to arm‟s-length, as well as related-party debt, has
been motivated by concern over income shifting by multinationals and the high leverage ratios resulting
from corporate acquisitions by private-equity funds). See also Lloyd, supra note 5, at 19 (suggesting that
country “best practice” standards be developed for the application of thin capitalization rules to leveraged
buyout cases).
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Australian thin capitalization legislation specifies the level of permissible debt for authorized deposit-taking
institutions (“ADIs”) in terms of a required capital base equal to 4 percent of risk-weighted assets. See
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See Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycle, supra note 34, at 5-6 (emphasizing the lack of data on leverage
levels, which are defined as the “ratio of collateral values to the down payment that must be made to buy
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See IMF, CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES, supra note 5, at 11-12 (observing that the tax bias in favour of
corporate debt may undercut the effectiveness of regulatory requirements for the financial services sector,
with the impact of externalities at a macro level likely to be especially large for this sector because of its
systemic importance).
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moderate financial instability should probably be based on tax-book asset value. This approach
allows the constraint on leverage levels for income tax purposes to operate somewhat
independently of the market forces that can otherwise lead to increasing levels of leverage as a
function of rising asset values and earnings.160
The incomplete consistency of taxation that is characteristic of dividend imputation
systems also leaves in place the significance of the familiar tax-law boundary between debt and
equity. By combining features commonly associated with one or the other form of instrument,
debt-equity hybrids can be used in an attempt to:
change the tax-law character of dividend payments to interest (“tax-deductible equity”);
or
change the tax-law character of interest payments to dividends (“debt-like shares”).
The conventional tax-policy focus is the revenue loss and efficiency effects associated with taxdriven substitution along this tax-law boundary.161 However, as the IMF paper notes, the
substitution of tax-deductible equity for debt may “ease the inefficiencies created by differential
tax treatment of the two, although at the cost of loss of revenue … and increased complexity and
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opacity of financial arrangements.”162 In other words, tax-deductible instruments with equity
features are imperfect substitutes that can enhance margins of safety, but at the cost of lost
revenue and otherwise desirable nontax features.
The extent to which hybrid instruments are developed as tax-driven substitutes remains
unclear empirically,163 with various nontax factors appearing to constrain complete
substitutability.164 Furthermore, tax-law uncertainty acts as an additional friction that constrains
tax-driven innovation of publicly-traded securities because of the pricing effect for tax
clienteles.165 In this environment, tax policymakers and tax administrators have tended to use a
combination of specific anti-avoidance rules, classification rules targeted to particular hybrids,
and a generalized factors approach to constrain taxpayer electivity along the debt-equity
boundary.166 Because comprehensive thin capitalization rules are premised on a prior
characterization of particular instruments as debt or equity, they can address the use of such
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instruments only indirectly. Nonetheless, by constraining the use of all forms of tax-deductible
debt (whether hybrid in nature or not), a comprehensive thin capitalization regime is a direct and
potentially effective policy instrument implicated by a focus on promotion of maintenance of
margins of safety. Introduction of the same focus as a policy-relevant factor in the execution of
the debt-equity classification exercise would not appear to add anything of definitive policy
value, given the lack of empirical knowledge of the extent of the use of tax-deductible hybrids
with equity features that might enhance maintenance of margins of safety.167
C. TAXATION OF SHARE GAINS
At least as an initial proposition, there is nothing special about capital gains, as a subset
of disposition gains, which would suggest that the concept be used as a gateway to the provision
of a lower tax rate. Appreciation in the value of an asset over its cost is a gain, and any decline is
a loss. These critical values are determined by discounting expected cash flows at an appropriate
risk-adjusted rate. The passage of time reveals changes in expectations that affect those cash
flows and, in turn, the value of the asset. The fact that cash flows are realized on disposition,
producing a gain or a loss, is arguably an arbitrary basis for recognition at a reduced rate.
Moreover, the fact that an asset is acquired for the purpose of trading does nothing to alter the
nature of the associated cash flows in a manner that should alter the tax treatment. There is,
however, an enormous literature challenging these simplistic propositions and articulating
various reasons for preferential treatment of capital gains.168 The narrow point made briefly here
in Part IV.C is that, even where standard tax rates are applied to gain or loss on financial
instruments generally, an exception to noncapital treatment might defensibly be made for share
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gains in an attempt to approximate the shareholder tax rate on dividends. Rather than the
standard anti-avoidance rationale, this rate equivalence can be justified as an attempt to further
reinforce a retention bias and the promotion of maintenance of margins of safety.
A capital gains preference is often justified as a stimulus to risk taking. As such, the
preference should probably be limited to unexpected gains that are attributable to the bet element
in financial instruments.169 Yet, to address revenue loss and inefficiencies associated with taxavoidance transactions, gain or loss attributable to the bet element in derivative financial
instruments, as well as debt,170 can be subjected to noncapital treatment, leaving any capital gains
preference to apply to shares that combine an expected time-value return with a substantial bet
element.171 Here again, an income tax system can defensibly distinguish between shares of
closely-held and widely-held corporations in its effect on risk taking. As already emphasized
above in Part IV.B, a possible equity capital market bias in the context of closely-held
corporations can be addressed by provision of a lower rate of corporate tax that encourages
retention of earnings. A capital gains preference that is limited to shares of such corporations can
be seen to reinforce this incentive effect. With shares of widely-held corporations, there is no
such bias and full taxation of realized gains could suppress some of the churning that is
characteristic of speculative trading, without significantly diminishing the price revelation and
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liquidity functions provided by public trading.172 But a tax bias in favor of retention can also be
seen as desirable if suppression of excessive leverage and promotion of maintenance of margins
of safety is the paramount policy goal. In fact, when the policy goal is reframed in this manner, a
capital gains tax preference - just like a corporate/shareholder tax-rate gap - can be supported
equally for shares of closely-held and widely-held corporations. In terms of rate choice, a capital
gains tax rate for shares that approximates the dividend tax rate can preserve the positive features
of a retention bias while avoiding the creation of tax-avoidance opportunities in the form of
dividend-stripping transactions.173
Even with a preferential tax rate for share gains, an element of double taxation remains
under dividend imputation systems because of a general failure to integrate the corporate and
shareholder-level taxes when retained earnings are reflected in the value of shares realized on a
disposition in the secondary market.174 In short, limitation of imputation regimes to dividend
distributions means that an element of double taxation arises similar to that under classical
corporate income tax systems. However, any efficiency losses associated with this element of
double taxation are uncertain. By providing a credit for corporate income tax paid, imputation
systems maintain the integrated treatment of dividend distributions, which reduces the double
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taxation of the distributed income.175 Where the distributed income has previously been taxed as
a gain realized on a disposition of the relevant shares, a corresponding loss attributable to the
dividend distribution will arise. To the extent that recognition of the loss is permitted,176 the
amount can be considered to effectively offset the prior gain, thereby eliminating any double
taxation. Although this offset is far from complete, it at least reduces the incidence of double
taxation. Perhaps more importantly, any double taxation that ultimately arises because of the
imposition of unintegrated corporate and shareholder-level income taxes on a secondary-market
transfer may be an overstated cause of efficiency losses, with any such losses compensated for by
a tax bias in favor of retention as a means to promote maintenance of margins of safety.

V.

LOSS LIMITATIONS AND RISK TAKING

As a stimulus to risk taking, the provision of a capital gains preference presumes the
presence of a market failure that results in an inadequate pool of risk capital. There is no clear
evidence, however, that the level of risk capital is deficient or that any discrimination in the tax
system against such investment by taxable investors causes a shortfall.177 It may instead be the
case that, in combination with an unrestricted interest expense deduction, a capital gains tax
preference results in excessive risk taking in capital markets. In fact, Minksy‟s financial
instability hypothesis, along with the mismeasurement of risk in capital markets, suggests that a
lower capital gains tax rate may exacerbate such behavior even in the presence of:
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a reduced recognition rate for capital losses reflecting the reduced inclusion rate for
capital gains; and
a restriction on the deductibility of capital losses to the amount of realized capital gains
as a response to the problem of selective realization.
Each of these features effectively increases the after-tax value of capital losses such that
deviation from the expected return associated with an asset is increased and, hence, the
associated risk. As posited in the taxation and risk taking literature, the attractiveness of risky
investments is reduced, which is presumed to result in a suboptimal level of risk taking. But
various features of markets for financial assets emphasized by Minsky‟s financial instability
hypothesis suggest that the increased after-tax return from a lower capital gains tax rate may
exert a much stronger pull in the direction of increased risk taking than the push of increased
after-tax losses in the other direction.178
In the wake of the recent credit crisis, the IMF paper notes only the ambiguous effect that
certain tax features such as a capital gains preference can have on asset prices;179 it also briefly
reviews the possible effects of the treatment of losses on risk taking,180 suggesting that
limitations on loss deductibility, as well as the application of progressive personal tax rates, can
act to suppress it. Consistent with the other limited tax-policy literature,181 the IMF paper
observes that this effect may be desirable where an unspecified set of nontax factors leads to
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excessive risk taking. This Part attempts to fill in much of the reasoning supporting this position.
It is at least plausible that capital loss quarantining and a reduced recognition rate for capital
losses are insufficient to suppress excessive risk taking. Corrective tax policy may require full
taxation rates applicable to gains on financial instruments and a combination of:182
tighter loss limitations applicable to such instruments; and
comprehensive interest expense deductibility restrictions under the personal income tax
as a form of loss limitation.
A. DOMAR-MUSGRAVE AND THE TAXATION AND RISK TAKING LITERATURE
Any discussion of the effect of taxation on risk taking begins with the model articulated
over 60 years ago by Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave.183 Under the simple Domar-Musgrave
model, portfolio choice is limited to two assets:
an asset without default risk yielding no real return; and
a risky asset in the sense that its payoff depends on a specified contingency.
To illustrate the fundamental insight of the model, assume that a risky asset is acquired at
a cost of $100 and has a 50 percent chance of paying $120 or a 50 percent chance of paying $80.
The expected return is zero ([0.5 x $20] – [0.5 x ($20)]), which is consistent with the expected
return on an alternative riskless asset. Investors determine the composition of their portfolios
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preferential tax rate for long positions in shares, even where it is justified as a means to alleviate the double
taxation of corporate equity income, might be extended to short sales to constrain upward price pressure).
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Evsey Domar & Richard Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388
(1944). But see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation on Risk
Taking, 83 Q.J. ECON. 263 (1969); and James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25
REV. ECON. STUDIES 65 (1958).
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based on their taste for risk. Symmetrical treatment of losses and gains ensures that the after-tax
gain/loss ratio is the same as the pre-tax ratio. For example, at a 40 percent tax rate, the positive
payoff would be $12, and the negative payoff would be ($12) (assuming refundability of losses
for income tax purposes at the 40 percent rate). In effect, the government shares at the same tax
rate in both gains and losses on the risky asset. By lowering the variance of possible payoffs,
symmetrical taxation of gains and losses reduces risk associated with the risky asset and may
induce a portfolio shift out of the riskless asset. However, an income effect may dominate the
substitution effect,184 with the government effectively serving a risk-bearing function through the
tax system. In this respect, recent consumption tax literature185 has emphasized the income effect
and, in particular, the ability of taxpayers to eliminate the taxation of the return to risk-bearing by
scaling up their risky asset positions to maintain the variance associated with their pre-tax
positions.186
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See Terrence R. Chorvat & Gavin Elkins, The Effect of the Taxation of Risky Income on Investment
Behavior (Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, The James Hausman Tax Law and Policy Workshop
Series October 2009) (laboratory experiment with university students as subjects indicates no scaling up in
the presence of symmetrical taxation of gain and loss and likely scaling down).
185

If taxpayers can freely adjust their investment portfolios to maintain the same pre-tax return on risky
assets, only the normal or riskless rate of return may be exempted under a consumption tax and taxed under
an income tax. The same proposition may extend to the risk premium for undiversifiable risk. See Joseph
Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 539 (1998); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a
Consumption Tax A Debate About Risk? Does it Matter? 47 TAX L. REV. 377 (1992); Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax? 52 TAX
L. REV. 1 (1996); and David A. Weisbach, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1 (2004). The
model on which this literature is based is articulated in Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A
General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT‟L. TAX J. 789 (1994). See also Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence
H. Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. ECONOMY 20 (1984); and Roger H. Gordon,
Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues Versus Tax Distortions, 100 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1985).
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See Thomas J. Brennan, Certainty and Uncertainty in the Taxation of Risky Returns (New York
University School of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, April 2009) (observing that
symmetric taxation of the return to risky assets provides a tax payoff profile equivalent to that of a forward
contract written on the underlying asset in an amount equal to the tax that can be eliminated by entering into
an equal and opposite forward contract).
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By introducing asymmetric taxation of gain and loss on risky assets, limitations on loss
deductibility alter the after-tax gain/loss ratio as compared to the pre-tax ratio.187 If, for example,
losses are not recognized while gains are taxed at 40 percent, the after-tax amount of the negative
payoff on the risky asset in the above example is the same as its pre-tax amount of $20; yet the
after-tax amount of the positive payoff is $12. With the gain/loss ratio altered in this particular
direction, investors may substitute the riskless asset for the risky asset. Common features of tax
systems, such as loss limitations and progressive personal tax rates, introduce asymmetric
treatment of gains and losses, which negates the ability to scale the magnitude of the bet element
associated with risky assets. Where the income effect dominates, governments are able to tax
returns to risk.188 Where the substitution effect dominates, risk taking is adversely affected, with
possible efficiency losses attributable to the shift away from risky assets.
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Asymmetric taxation of gains and losses can also be a function of the application of progressive personal
income tax rates. See Shaviro, Financial Crisis, supra note 5, at 13 (suggesting that a progressive tax rate
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are the principal source for large publicly-traded corporations). The extent that loss limitations are binding,
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Auerbach, Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another Look, 53 CESIFO ECON. STUDIES
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In fact, loss limitations and progressive personal income tax rates have much the same
effect as transaction costs and other nontax factors that constrain scaling as well as the
substitution effect.189 Deborah Schenk argues, for example, that the imputation of interest at the
riskless rate on all capital assets (including shares) is normatively desirable as a tax base, since
the return to risk is taxed only accidentally under an income tax when nontax factors constrain
the ability to alter portfolios in response to the tax.190 However, loss limitations have independent
normative significance under an income tax and have generally been seen by tax policymakers to
trump possible efficiency losses associated with any behavioral response to asymmetric tax rates
for gains and losses. Moreover, the taxation and risk taking literature assumes that risk is
accurately priced, in which case the application of asymmetric rates can induce a behavioral
response with efficiency losses. As emphasized in Part II.B, the dynamics of financial markets,
along with incomplete risk-modeling techniques, have destabilizing consequences. In this
environment, loss limitations can also be justified as a constraint on excessive risk taking.191 But
even ignoring the quantitative targeting problem attributable to an inability to calibrate the
amount of any corrective tax, the use of loss limitations to moderate risk taking presents a
difficult qualitative targeting issue. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between different
types of losses for income tax purposes, since not all losses are attributable to risk taking. 192 A
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defensible distinction may also be drawn between losses that are attributable to risk taking in the
market for consumer goods and services and the same type of losses incurred in financial
markets. As a constraint on excessive risk taking, the case for tight loss limitations is strongest in
the latter setting, subject to an important exception for a hedge-accounting regime.
The standard rationale for loss limitations is the revenue cost that refundability would
entail. The more nuanced version of this rationale depends on the cause of the loss. For this
purpose, losses may be characterized as within one of the following general types:193
economic losses attributable to risk taking;
tax losses attributable to the provision of tax expenditures or preferences for particular
types of investment or activities;
income mismeasurement losses attributable to income inclusion or expense deduction
features that are adopted for compliance cost or administrative reasons; and
tax-avoidance losses and/or fraudulent activity losses attributable to tax-avoidance
transactions intended to create or transfer the loss and/or fraudulent reporting of revenue
or expense.
Loss limitations within the third and fourth categories can be used to protect the revenue
where, respectively, income measurement rules cannot be improved or anti-avoidance provisions
and enforcement measures targeting tax avoidance and/or tax evasion are incomplete.194
Limitations on losses within the first and second categories may be chosen as an alternative to
refundability because of the associated revenue cost. 195 With tax losses attributable to the

Under the Domar-Musgrave Risk Model, 24 AUSTL. TAX F. 77 (2009) [hereinafter McIntyre, Identifying
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provision of tax expenditures, the value of the particular tax expenditure is reduced, but
presumably on the basis of an assessment that the amount of any forgone efficiency gains
attributable to the behavioral response otherwise intended to be induced by the tax-expenditure
program are less than the revenue saved by limiting the cost of the program. With economic
losses attributable to risk taking, any associated efficiency losses are presumably seen to be less
than the revenue saved by a rejection of refundability.
McIntyre argues 196 that the adoption of broad loss limitations applicable equally across
losses within all four of these general categories is required in the absence of an ability to
identify and prohibit the deduction of losses that are attributable to income mismeasurement or
tax avoidance/fraudulent activity. This identification problem leaves tax policymakers with the
choice of selective refundability, either full or partial, for economic and tax losses arising in
specified circumstances or in connection with specified activities. For example, tax-expenditure
programs, such as preferential treatment for expenditures on basic research, are often delivered in
the form of refundable tax credits. Alternatively, losses generated with accelerated recognition of
capital expenses may be permitted to be flowed through to investors for recognition. These
exceptions to less than full refundability of expenses enhance the value of the relevant program
where such enhancement is considered desirable. It is much more difficult, however, to extend
full loss refundability beyond these kinds of specified expenditure programs without also
providing recognition of losses attributable to income mismeasurement and taxavoidance/fraudulent activity.
This identification exercise emphasized by McIntyre is arguably altered where
limitations on the recognition of risk-based losses are justified as a means to dampen excessive
risk taking. Under this very different rationale, limitations on such losses serve as a form of
corrective taxation that is intended to induce a portfolio shift away from risky assets. Indeed, the
behavioral response that is assumed to be suboptimal in the taxation and risk taking literature
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becomes a desirable effect of limitations on economic losses, presumably on the basis that risk is
otherwise mismeasured or, as suggested by Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis, investors
reduce margins of safety as they increasingly take on leverage in an environment of rising asset
prices and profits. But as noted already, operationalizing this particular rationale for the
application of limitations on the recognition of risk-based losses may require a distinction to be
drawn between the incurrence of these losses in the market for consumer goods and services and
those losses incurred in capital markets. The former may provide the best case for the empirical
assumption in the taxation and risk taking literature that asymmetric treatment of gains and losses
attributable to the imposition of loss limitations imposes efficiency losses attributable to the
substitution effect. In effect, risk associated with investments in the real economy is often
undiversifiable, and the case is strongest for the government to act as a risk bearer through the
provision of either loss refundability or carryover with an interest gross up to preserve the full
value of any loss.197 Tax policymakers must still exercise judgment that any efficiency gains
warrant the associated revenue loss and the potential for inappropriate recognition of losses
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See e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Notes on Taxation and Risk Taking, 24 AUSTL. TAX F. 31, 34 (2009)
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providing the equivalent of insurance through the tax system for assets that are traded in limited markets);
Shaviro, Financial Crisis, supra note 5, at 15 (“Thus, one could plausibly surmise that the main riskdiscouraging effects of nonrefundability relate to risk-taking that has greater social merit, such as that by
entrepreneurs establishing start-up companies in which the players will largely bear their own losses rather
than passing them onto others in the manner of „too-big-to-fail‟ financial institutions.”); and Michael P.
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attributable to income mismeasurement and/or tax-avoidance/fraudulent activity. In this respect,
forms of limited loss refundability tend to be targeted to the small business sector where shares
and debt of issuers are not traded in deep and liquid markets, and investors bear undiversifiable
risk attributable to the payoff profiles and value of the underlying assets.198 Moreover,
transaction costs and incomplete markets mean investors cannot scale their investments in risky
assets, and governments collect tax on the returns to risk.
These same conditions do not hold with financial instruments traded in deep and liquid
markets. Unique risk can be diversified, and scaling up the magnitude of a bet is more readily
possible, particularly with derivative financial instruments.199 Despite the lack of any definitive
empirical evidence, 200 limitations on the recognition of economic losses may be invoked as a
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means to moderate excessive risk taking attributable to scaling, which can have systemic risk
implications when the instability-breeding dynamics of financial markets are exacerbated by the
mismeasurement of risk or other failures of risk management.201 In the absence of any behavioral
response to loss limitations that would moderate exposure to systemic risk, government must
assume a role of insurer by acting as lender of last resort and propping up asset values and profits
by stimulating demand in a downturn. The application of loss limitations in publicly-traded asset
markets, where diversification is otherwise available and scaling can more readily eliminate
taxation of risk, can be defended as a form of insurance premium202 that is extracted by
government for already serving these risk-bearing roles as lender of last resort and provider of
aggregate demand in an economic downturn. In short, it is not clear that government needs to
serve an additional risk-bearing role through the provision of loss refundability in this market.203
Serving such a risk-bearing function may even exacerbate market failures that are the source of
excessive risk taking. Although the same result may be attributable to the government‟s other
risk-bearing functions, those functions must be filled by government because of the absence of
any comparable market institution.204 This is not the case with investment in risky assets where

ALPHA: HOW RECKLESS GROWTH AND UNCHECKED AMBITION RUINED THE CITY‟S
GOLDEN DECADE 75-95 (2009); and BERNSTEIN, EVOLVING, supra note 46, at 148-64. But see also
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deep and liquid markets provide a broad range of self-insurance opportunities through portfolio
diversification.
As a form of loss limitation, a prohibition on the recognition of losses on derivative
financial instruments, as well as traded debt and shares, would be the strongest policy instrument
intended to correct market failure in the form of excessive risk taking or, alternatively, to limit
the extent of publicly-provided insurance in capital markets. Complete nonrecognition of such
losses could inappropriately constrain, however, the price revelation and liquidity functions of
these markets, with offsetting efficiency losses.205 A weaker response would be limitation of the
deduction of unexpected losses attributable to the bet element in the same set of instruments to
the amount of any unexpected gains that are similarly attributable to the bet element in such
instruments. This form of limitation is comparable to that for capital losses under a realizationbased capital gains tax system with less than full recognition rates, and is required to the extent
that gains and losses are treated on noncapital account.206 A defensible case can also be made for
the use of this kind of broad limitation as an alternative to comprehensive marking-to-market as a
response to the problem of selective realization. For the most part, existing legislative regimes do
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not rely on marking-to-market as the principal response to selective realization; nor do they
reflect a well-targeted approach based on liquidity as a proxy for instruments that can be
strategically traded because of low transaction costs.207 A rule limiting the deduction of riskbased losses against risk-based gains on financial instruments is seen in some of the tax-policy
literature as a means to address the problem of selective realization, albeit at the expense of a
potentially adverse impact on risk taking attributable to asymmetric recognition rates.208
However, as a policy instrument intended to moderate risk taking in deep and liquid markets for
financial instruments, any form of broad loss limitation rule would remain binding even if
comprehensive mark-to-market reporting were applied to such instruments as a response to the
problem of selective realization.209
An important exception from a tighter noncapital loss limitation applied to financial
instruments as the functional equivalent of a corrective tax on risk taking can be made for those
instruments that are used as to hedge positions in nonfinancial assets.210 Taxing a hedge with
reference to an underlying position ensures matching of both character and timing of gain and
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loss on the offsetting positions. By maintaining symmetry of effective tax rates, adverse pricing
effects that might otherwise inhibit efficient hedging strategies are avoided.211 In effect, because
they are risk-reducing transactions, hedge transactions can be excluded from a tighter loss
limitation rule as a means to reinforce the dampening effect provided by maintenance of margins
of safety.212
Another possible exception would provide some form of targeted loss refundability as a
means to allow financially-distressed corporations to restructure.213 As one possible example,
Canada allows financially-distressed corporations to use accumulated tax losses to lower their
after-tax cost of financing by replacing outstanding debt held by arm‟s-length creditors with
preferred shares (“distress preferred shares”) paying tax-sheltered dividends.214 Nonetheless, the
rationale for this tax expenditure program, as well as the specifics of its targeting, is problematic.
Perhaps most importantly, no attempt is made to limit the program to those corporations whose
failure would entail systemic risk. The broader availability of the program suggests that it can be
supported more defensibly as a means to alleviate “congestion externalities” otherwise associated
with the mass layoff of employees on the failure of a business. Although it has not been the
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subject of any empirical inquiry, any impact on risk taking from the relaxation of the binding
nature of loss limitations in these limited circumstances may be weak.215
B. RESTRICTIONS ON THE DEDUCTION OF INTEREST EXPENSE UNDER THE
PERSONAL INCOME TAX AS A FORM OF LOSS LIMITATION
Because the immediate cause of the current credit crisis was a price collapse in the US
housing market, it is understandable that the status of the home mortgage interest deduction in
that country has attracted attention. When it comes to the personal income tax, it is unsurprising,
therefore, that the tax-policy literature highlights tax preferences for housing, including the
deductibility of home mortgage interest (or other form of home mortgage tax relief such as a tax
credit).216 Once the housing market recovers, the IMF paper suggests, for example, that countries
with such relief consider phasing it out in the absence of the taxation of imputed rental income
associated with home ownership.217 The apparent basis for this recommendation is the perceived
need to eliminate a tax bias in favor of household leverage as a source of financial instability in
this particular asset market.
It seems reasonably clear, however, that the housing price bubble was fueled primarily
by innovative mortgage lending techniques which met an otherwise unsatisfied demand.218 To a
limited extent, the home mortgage interest deduction may have played a secondary role in
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lowering the after-tax cost of financing and feeding this demand,219 which was met with supply
from both domestic and foreign savings through the originate and distribute securitization model.
Given this likely limited role of the home mortgage interest deduction, it is surprising that
consideration of the relationship between tax policy and financial instability does not go further
and discuss restrictions on the deduction of investment interest expense under the personal
income tax as a particular form of loss limitation which can similarly constrain excessive risk
taking associated with excessive household leverage. This Part broadens the focus on the
relationship between tax policy and financial instability to consider the policy case for
comprehensive restrictions on the deductibility of interest expense generally under the personal
income tax.
As reflected in standard country practice, the case for nondeductibility of home mortgage
interest expense is strong where the return from this dual-purpose asset is commonly taxpreferred in the form of the exemption of realized gain and the nontaxation of imputed rental
income. In the presence of these tax preferences for this particular asset, the personal
consumption element can be taken as dominant and the associated interest expense denied
deductibility like any other personal consumption expense. In this respect, tax policymakers in
many countries have concluded that any spillover benefits associated with home ownership do
not warrant the provision of an additional subsidy in the form of home mortgage interest relief.
The contentious issue is, instead, the need for restrictions on the deduction of investment interest
expense as a particularized form of loss limitation applicable to expected loss in the form of
interest expense rather than unexpected loss attributable to the resolution of a bet element in a
financial instrument.220 In fact, the conventional framing of the policy case for investment
interest restrictions is not unlike that for loss limitations generally. Moreover, when the case is
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reframed as an attempt to impose a corrective tax on excessive leverage, the parameters of
investment interest expense restrictions are similar to those of the loss limitation rule for
financial instruments suggested in the immediately preceding Part V.A.
Interest expense limitations under the personal income tax are conventionally justified in
the tax-policy literature as a means to limit the distributional and efficiency effects otherwise
associated with income mismeasurement;221 they target the windfall gains otherwise available
from an accrual-based interest expense deduction on borrowed funds used to acquire an asset that
generates tax-preferred revenue or gain attributable to either tax-expenditure provisions or
structural timing rules. As with loss limitations generally, the strongest case for the application of
interest deductibility limitations is provided by straddle transactions, which combine offsetting
expected cash flows and are entered into to derive a tax benefit from the inconsistent tax
treatment of the short (borrowing) and long (asset acquisition) sides of the transaction. As
instances of tax avoidance, these transactions are devoid of any desirable consequential
attributes. By restoring consistency of tax treatment of loss and gain associated with the short
and long sides of straddle transactions, restrictions on the deduction of interest expense eliminate
the tax benefit which is the only reason to enter into such transactions. The necessary assessment
of the consequential attributes of an unrestricted interest expense deduction are much more
problematic, however, when the focus shifts from straddle transactions to nonstraddle
transactions - that is, transactions that are, in part, equity financed such that the expected cash
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flows on a long asset acquisition exceed the expected cash flows on an associated short
borrowing.
Ignoring legislative design features for the moment, those who are skeptical about the
policy case for broadly-based restrictions on the deduction of interest expense under the personal
income tax tend to characterize such restrictions as just one specific type of limitation on the
recognition of losses.222 In other words, they highlight a negative consequential attribute of
broadly-based restrictions on the interest expense deduction that is, in fact, seen to be
characteristic of loss limitations generally: By reducing the tax rate on unexpected losses and
thereby increasing the after-tax amount of those losses, a broadly-based loss limitation increases
the variance of the after-tax returns on a wide range of affected assets, which can deter
investment in those assets. In this respect, there is nothing particularly unique about broadlybased restrictions on the deduction of interest expense. Where a taxpayer borrows funds to
acquire an income-earning asset, unexpected loss is realized when the expected cash flows
associated with the long asset acquisition do not materialize. Because the unexpected loss is
attributable, in part, to interest expense on the short borrowing, a restriction on the deduction of
the interest expense can result in an increase of the after-tax amount of the unexpected loss, with
a negative impact on risk taking following from the increased variance in after-tax returns that
the deductibility restriction causes. Protection of the revenue base, as well as maintenance of an
acceptable income distribution and limitation of the cost of tax-expenditure provisions, is thus
seen to come at the cost of a potentially adverse impact on risk taking.
Where the target of interest expense restrictions is a range of nonstraddle transactions
with consequential attributes that are nonetheless seen to warrant a response, some form of
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passive loss limitations223 is the obvious target-effective response. This type of legislative regime
relies on the identification of particular income sources (for example, investment income and
passively-earned business income) as the core targeting feature. The character of the identified
income sources is effectively used as a proxy for the consequential attributes that presumably
justify application of the interest deductibility restrictions to straddle transactions and a range of
nonstraddle transactions. But if the rationale for interest deductibility restrictions under the
personal income tax is reframed as a corrective tax on excessive risk-taking associated with
excessive leverage, the case for some form of passive loss limitations arguably becomes that
much stronger. Similar to loss limitations generally, the strongest case for the application of such
limitations as a restriction on the deduction of interest expense is in the context of asset
acquisitions in deep and liquid markets where diversification of risk is readily available and
scaling of any bet is possible at low transaction costs.224 Interest deductibility restrictions as a
particularized form of loss limitation ensure that the government does not act as an insurer and
collects tax on risk taking; they also may suppress excessive leverage characteristic of
speculative and Ponzi finance states and promote maintenance of margins of safety. Indeed,
interest deductibility restrictions can support regulatory limitations on leverage, such as margin
requirements and minimum levels of equity for mortgage eligibility.
A focus on the type of income source may also be a much better proxy for the
application of restrictions as a corrective tax on excessive leverage. In particular, passive sources
of income tend to be closely associated with financial assets acquired in deep and liquid markets,
which are the most susceptible to excessive risk taking. An exception for income earned in an
active business can serve as a proxy for an inability to diversify, in which case the potentially
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adverse effects of interest deductibility restrictions on risk taking are most compelling, and the
government should act as a risk bearer. Indeed, even with an unrestricted interest expense
deduction in this particular context, full loss refundability is undermined by noncapital loss
limitations, which may or may not strike an appropriate balance between the need for a constraint
on excessive risk taking associated with an unrestricted interest expense deduction and any
adverse impact on risk taking that deductibility restrictions might entail. The same balance need
not be struck, however, with investment in the housing market. Although there is not the same
ability to diversity risk as there is with deep and liquid markets for financial assets, real estate
speculation should be ineligible for an active business exception and thereby subject to interest
deductibility restrictions. As the recent credit crisis illustrates all too painfully, investment in this
market is especially susceptible to speculative and Ponzi financing.225

VI. CONCLUSION
A focus on moderation of financial instability as a public policy goal requires a
comprehensive reexamination of regulatory regimes which are necessarily limited in their
application to the supply side of capital markets. Consistent with an emerging literature, this
article has suggested some directions in which tax policy can play an important secondary role,
particularly on the demand side of capital markets where the effect of regulatory regimes focused
on the supply side is indirect. More particularly, tax constraints on leverage, both corporate and
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household, can moderate the “animal spirits”226 that drive capital markets to extremes of
optimism. Given various practical policy constraints that necessitate incomplete consistency of
the taxation of returns to corporate debt and equity, the article emphasizes how certain of the
features of dividend imputation systems can promote maintenance of margins of safety, primarily
through a tax bias in favor of the retention of earnings for a range of taxable investors. This bias
should be supported, however, by adoption of comprehensive thin capitalization rules intended to
constrain the appetite for corporate leverage of tax-exempt and nonresident investors. Limits on
the deductibility of interest expense under the personal income tax targeted to investment in the
housing market, as well as publicly-traded financial assets, can similarly be justified as necessary
tax constraints. In addition, tighter limitations on the recognition of unexpected losses on
financial instruments generally, along with full taxation of unexpected gains, can be framed as
the equivalent of a tax intended to correct excessive risk taking in the face of its
mismeasurement. But given the empirical ambiguity of their effectiveness, such limitations can
be supported, alternatively, as a constraint on the extent of the provision of public insurance.
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